


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
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OF THE OPENING OF THE COLUMBIA POINT CAMPUS
OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS

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January, 1973

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
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THE IMPACT ON HOUSING
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


Table of Contents

	Pages
I. Introduction	1:1-15
✓II. The Community: Dorchester and Columbia Point	2:1-5
III. Student Survey	3:1-30
IV. The Staff and Faculty	4:1-7
V. Transportation	5:1-8
VI. University Policies	6:1-10
1. Admissions and Enrollment	1
2. Jobs	5
3. Board of Trustees	9
VII. Special Problems of Columbia Point	7:1-12
VIII. Housing Development	8:1-21
1. Why housing development?	2
2. For whom should the housing be developed?	2
3. By whom?	4
4. What is the community's role?	7
5. Are there sites for housing development?	7
6. Who finances building housing for the community?	12
7. Who finances student housing?	15
8. Should the community be a housing developer?	17
9. What kind of control can the community have if it isn't the developer?	18
10. What about rehabilitation?	20
IX. Vehicles for Community Control or Management	9:1-9
X. Protecting the Community's Housing Resources	10:1-11
1. Helping the Homeowner	1
2. Helping the Tenant	6
XI. Public Sector Responsibility	11:1-5
1. What can the University do?	2
2. What can the City do?	3
3. What can the State do?	4

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

When the decision to open a branch of the University of Massachusetts in Boston was made, surely it was no one's intention simply to bring another higher education facility to Boston. If there is one thing Boston would seem to have enough of, it is colleges and universities. No, right from the very beginning, UMass Boston was to be an institution which was different from all the others - different in that, being public, it was to serve the public. It was to provide higher education to those who could otherwise not afford higher education in private institutions.

Other decisions followed from the first - if UMass Boston was aimed at students who could not spend much money on their education, then they had to be able to continue to live at home, so as not to spend money on living expenses. Thus, UMass Boston would be a commuter college. If UMass Boston was to serve the public, its education should provide incentives and training for students to serve the public. Thus, College III, the College of Community and Public Service, was conceived - a college to enable students to learn skills and attitudes which would be of immediate value to their communities, and to learn and practice these skills while working in their community for income and experience.

Still other decisions were forced upon the University. Its first facilities were in vacant downtown office buildings - no one else wanted them, and UMass could use them. So, in September, 1965, UMass Boston found its first home right in the heart of one of the decaying business districts in Central Boston, and classes began. This location offered tremendous advantages. It was close to the heart of the area's metropolitan transportation system, the MBTA, it was close to the world-famous Boston Public Library, it was even close to the State House so that legislators could, if they wished, make first-hand observations of the state's urban higher education operation.

UMass Boston grew by leaps and bounds. It opened over capacity - facilities had been prepared for one-hundred students in September, 1965, and two-hundred and fifty showed up - and it outgrew its buildings faster than they could be acquired. It anticipated three-thousand

students by 1969, but burst out of its first building with twenty-eight hundred in 1967.

At the same time all this educational vitality was taking place in temporary quarters, the search for a permanent site was underway. In the course of this quest, many of the issues still plaguing the college surfaced and the problems faced today by the Dorchester-Columbia Point communities could have been foreseen, if anybody had looked.

The first site considered, even before the temporary facilities were acquired, was the Murphy Army General Hospital in Waltham. Here were ninety-five rolling suburban acres with a surplus federal facility on them, surrounded by hundreds of additional acres of open land owned by several public and private institutions and close by the fifty-acre Waltham field station, already owned by the University. Senator Kennedy was in the midst of negotiating for the facility when the legislature indicated they wanted UMass Boston located in the city, available to student commuters.

The next permanent site to be considered utilized air rights over the Massachusetts Turnpike for more than half its acreage, and ran from Copley Square into the South End. This site was opposed by the business community, including the John Hancock Insurance Company, then planning their new skyscraper in the area, the Christian Science Church, which had a massive urban renewal project in the works on the other side of the site, the Boston Redevelopment Authority, which wanted to use the area for revenue-producing commercial buildings, the Greater Boston Real Estate Board, which felt that there were quite enough students in the area anyway - a feeling in which they were joined by all the Back Bay civic groups, the City Council, and the press.

Coalitions like this emerged each time serious consideration was given to other downtown sites, such as North Station and the idea of a scattered campus spreading out from the temporary buildings along transportation lines and also utilizing Turnpike air rights.

A different problem emerged with consideration of the Highland Park urban renewal area in Roxbury. Here, the community feared that the University wanted more than the forty cleared or abandoned acres of renewal land available. Eventually, the community and its legislators, scarred from years of war with the BRA and afraid that if the University settled there it would mean the taking of still more homes, declared opposition to the plan and brought the rest of the political apparatus into line with them. Another possibility foreclosed.

It is clear that the University saw itself as a public good and never adequately prepared the political case for its site choices. It is equally clear, however, that the state and the city were exceedingly ambivalent about the school's growth and future. The city wanted no more encroachments on potentially taxable land; the Boston Redevelopment Authority was particularly outspoken that its plans for the city's regrowth required that all in-town tax concessions be made for the purpose of encouraging revenue and growth producing development, development which added to the city's capital attractiveness, rather than duplicating an already overplentiful asset - educational institutions. The state wanted to have an urban university as recommended by the educational planners, but would not spend a penny more than absolutely necessary, and the legislators did not foresee the very expensive consequences of 1968's economies. Lastly, the years when this decision was being made were the years of burgeoning student unrest, and no public figure was willing to gamble very far on the gratefulness of students or of the taxpaying public for expenses made on the students' behalf.

The final choice of Columbia Point for a site reflected all these factors. It was not tax-producing land, nor were any tax-producing uses seeking to locate there; the redevelopment authority had no higher plans for the area. Land acquisition costs were minimal and, although building costs were greatly increased because the site was a seaside marsh filled with twenty years of garbage and needed deep piles on which to support the buildings, and extra sound-proofing to shut out the noise of jet planes making their landing at Logan International Airport a couple miles away, these costs could be amortized over the life of twenty-five year educational facilities bonds. Lastly, what better place could be found for unruly and possibly fractious students than on a peninsula jutting into the harbor, with only one access road and six-thousand housing project residents for their only neighbors.

The formation of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force and the Housing Impact Study.

As September, 1973, the opening date for the Columbia Point campus approaches, the communities nearby have grown concerned. The high-rise housing project buildings had formerly seemed out of scale with neighboring Dorchester and South Boston. But the University buildings are huge, dwarfing the housing development, and they loom larger day by day as construction progresses. The communities began to

sense the size of the university community that would suddenly move in among them. How many people would fill those buildings? Where would they come from and how would they get there? And if it wasn't easy to get there, where would they live?

The people of the Boston area have watched the phenomenon of spontaneous, unpremeditated takeover of older low- and middle-income communities by university-related people - Cambridge in the '50's and '60's, Brighton and Allston and the Back Bay more recently. The newspapers have been full of the sad statistics of low-income families displaced from their homes by landlords who could charge groups of students twice and three times the previous rent.

The housing shortage in the Boston areas has been well-documented over the years, and the greater purchasing power of students and faculty have created increasingly critical shortages of decent housing for low- and moderate-income residents wherever the students and the faculty have chosen to live.

The people of Dorchester are afraid that they are next in this sequence. So are the people of the Columbia Point housing development. Both fear that they will be displaced to make way for students.

In November, 1971, the Dorchester Tenants Action Council (DTAC) and another community group, The People First (TPF), approached the University to ask what was being done to protect the community from the consequences of the opening of the campus. The University responded that it would be glad to cooperate with the community, but that the two organizations that had come to it were not sufficiently broad-based and representative. DTAC and TPF were told to come back when they could speak for a broader spectrum of the community.

It seems pretty clear that no one expected what happened next. Twenty-six community organizations in Dorchester, representing homeowners and tenants, black and white, improvement associations, neighborhood houses and action groups joined together as the Dorchester Task Force and came to speak jointly to the University about their fears of the impact on their community of the opening of the campus. The University agreed to seek funds to pay for a study performed by an independent consultant who would examine and assess what the impact on housing would be of the expected university students, staff, and faculty. The Task Force continued in its efforts to broaden its base and was joined by the Columbia

Point Development Council and the Columbia Point UMass Coordinating Committee. South Boston organizations were also approached, but they did not wish to participate in the joint effort and have remained outside the boundaries of the study.

Negotiations between the University, the Task Force, and the consultant chosen by the Task Force, Justin Gray Associates (JGA), took place in the late Spring, and a three-way agreement was reached on the study to be performed, and on a funding arrangement through which the University would pay the consultant's bills, but only the Task Force could approve or disapprove the bills (see Appendix A). In this manner, while the University had approved in advance the scope of the study, only the community would have control over its execution. No public money was involved in this arrangement. The University raised the money used from local business interests, including Boston Edison Company, Boston Gas Company, Boston Five Cents Savings Bank, and New England Telephone Company. Unfortunately, the funds collected were quite limited and the scope of the study had to be severely limited accordingly.

JGA agreed to carry out a survey of present UMass students, staff and faculty, to determine where they were now living, and where they thought they would live if they were attending UMass when the Columbia Point campus opened; to investigate University policies related to development; to see what the coming of the University to the Point would mean for residents of the Columbia Point housing development with regard to their community and to jobs either in, or associated with, the University; and to investigate the possibilities of developing housing for either students or the community, both in Dorchester and on Columbia Point.

There is no mention of transportation in the work program. However, quite early in the study it became apparent that the housing impact was related directly to the lack of transportation facilities for the thousands of students, faculty and staff who were expected. If commuting to Columbia Point is simple and quick, then people living within a reasonable distance could be expected to remain in their homes. But if commuting is lengthy and difficult, many more people could be expected to try and settle closer to the campus. Therefore, JGA agreed to assist the community in its efforts to draw attention to the approaching transportation crisis and to play a constructive role in developing solutions to that crisis.

One thing JGA and the Task Force refused to do. The University indicated some skepticism that one could prove the impact on housing of any number of students unless a detailed analysis of the existing housing market was carried out. Inasmuch as such an analysis, if done at all adequately, would have called for two to three times the entire budget of the study, the Task Force refused to divert its resources in this manner. Furthermore, the Task Force maintained that, whether there was only a minor housing shortage (as some real estate interests claimed) or the major and critical shortage the residents claimed, this seemed irrelevant in the face of the arrival of a community of six-thousand people in 1973, slated to increase to seventeen-thousand by 1980.

Given the seriousness of the charge that a housing impact study could not be given credence without a housing market study, the Task Force's reasons for not participating in such analysis will be covered in greater detail later in this Chapter.

Constraints on the University

Initially, the community perceived its problem to be the University. It was the University which had decided to build at Columbia Point, was refusing to think about housing, was responsible for the increasing difficulty in obtaining mortgage or home improvement money in Dorchester, was aiding and abetting those forces that would turn Dorchester into a second Cambridge.

One consequence of this study has been a growing awareness on the part of the community that, to some extent, the University is a victim of the same forces which victimize the community - the city's need for tax revenue and its concomitant unwillingness to give up tax-producing land, the business and real estate community's desire to maximize profits, and the legislature's unending battle against the irrepressibly increasing budget.

In fact, the limits on University actions are considerable. Its two basic constraints stem from the fact that what it may or may not do are strictly determined by the governor and the legislature, and its operating budget is determined annually by the governor and the legislature. Unlike private educational institutions which, however straitened their financial circumstances, have basic capitalization and a relatively steady income from this capitalization, the state university has no income of its own. There is an assumption that the legislature will continue to fund programs and salaries that the University has contracted for, but this is not an enforceable obligation on the state, and

the current budget controversy makes clear the vulnerability of the University at this level.

The old maxim goes, "Man proposes, God disposes." For the University this means the Administration proposes, the trustees ratify or veto, and the governor and legislature dispose. A single example - the transportation crisis now facing the community, the University, and the city and its southern suburbs - will demonstrate the problem.

The legislature, in rejecting the Murphy Army General Hospital site in Waltham, laid down the policy that UMass Boston was to be an urban school. Thus, it reversed a decision by the trustees which would have developed a Waltham campus similar in most respects to the Amherst campus, with parallel curricula, graduate schools and degrees. The temporary location in Park Square fulfilled this new policy requirement to perfection, and the UMass Boston administration set about with enthusiasm to build their urban curriculum. However, as site choices for a permanent campus narrowed inexorably to Columbia Point, voices in student body, faculty and trustees called attention to the problems such a site would produce.

In the first budget submitted by the University after the decision to move to Columbia Point was taken and the legislation authorizing this move enacted (Ch. 989 of the Acts of 1969), the University included a request for \$9 million to study, design, and construct a transportation facility so that the majority of students and staff could continue to reach the campus by public transportation. This request never even reached the legislature; it was stricken from the budget in the Governor's office, where the University was told that transportation was not its business - it should stick to education, where it had quite enough problems. The following year, the University included a similar request for \$2 million to develop transportation plans and designs. This, too, was rejected on the same grounds. The third year, the University submitted its request to do transportation planning in a separate piece of legislation, not included in the budget which had to go through the Governor's office before it could reach the legislature. However, the legislature responded in the same way as the Governor's budget office in the past - the University should stay out of the transportation business where it does not belong.

In fairness to the Governor's office and the legislature, it was true that the University had plenty of problems in its educational balliwick - so true that it never was able to muster sufficient energy to draw attention to the

transportation crisis it sensed was coming, and had tried to get authorization to meet. Nevertheless, it was the state, through the governor or the legislature, and not the University, that made the series of three decisions which have brought about the current transportation mess: first, that UMass Boston was an urban school and should not locate in Waltham; second, that UMass Boston should not be located in any of the accessible central city sites available; and third, that UMass Boston should not work on the transportation problem it saw as part of the development process of the Columbia Point campus.

How are decisions affecting university policy made? The basic law establishing and governing the University is Chapter 75 of the General Laws of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Here, the state university is described, the board of trustees is given sole governing power, and the university is placed within the state department of education but exempted from its control. The university is to "provide....education programs, research, extension, and continuing education services in the liberal arts and sciences and in the professions... with exclusive jurisdiction in agriculture.... (It) may establish branches...and shall, subject only to such general authority in the board of higher education, have complete authority to establish, locate, support, consolidate, or abolish classes, courses, curricula, departments, divisions, schools or colleges of the university wherever and whenever required in meeting the needs of the commonwealth in the fields of public higher education. A branch of the university shall be established at such place on or in the vicinity of the city of Boston as the trustees may deem conducive to the accomplishment of the aforesaid purposes and shall be there maintained so long as the trustees may deem necessary or desirable." (Sec. 2). But, "Notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary, the general court shall annually appropriate such sums as it deems necessary for the maintenance, operation and support of the university." (Sec. 8).

There are special sections and laws dealing with university housing and development. "The trustees shall administer property held in accordance with special trusts, and shall also administer grants or devises of land and gifts of personal property made to the commonwealth for the use of the university... The trustees may, from time to time, establish and manage trust funds for self-amortizing projects and self-supporting activities including, but not limited to, the operation of the boarding halls,... dormitories and student and faculty apartments." (Sec. 11). But, in 1964, the Attorney General issued an opinion stating that this section does not entitle the trustees to establish and manage such a fund and expend the proceeds.

Also, the trustees may lease or sell small parcels of land in Amherst and South Hadley to faculty, staff, fraternities or other such associations on which to build housing. Each transaction of this kind must be approved by the Governor and the Governor's Council. (Secs. 25, 26, and 27).

The University of Massachusetts Building Authority was established by the legislature (Ch. 773 of the Acts of 1960) to build, acquire, maintain and operate living facilities for the University. (Sec. 3). Section 4 empowers it to acquire, hold and dispose of real property and to lease, purchase, or receive a grant of land from the Commonwealth, and Section 5 permits the trustees to give, lease, or sell university land in Amherst or South Hadley to the Authority with the approval of the Governor and Governor's Council. There is no parallel authorization for using university land at Columbia Point; neither is there any prohibition on such a transaction. The Building Authority is to be self-supporting. Its bonds are tax exempt and guaranteed by the Commonwealth and the current authorization is up to \$80 million. Initially, there was a 5 percent ceiling on interest. This was removed temporarily between September 5, 1966 and April 30, 1967, and was removed permanently in August, 1970.

Lastly, Chapter 642 of the Acts of 1971 prohibits the university from taking, "by eminent domain, any land owned by the Savin Hill Yacht Club for the establishment of a campus..."

The critical factor in implementing the decisions authorized through these laws is the appropriation power of the legislature. After the University decides on future programs or facilities, it incorporates them into the budget it submits to the Governor's office annually in the fall, along with all other state departments. Here, the budget is reviewed first by the budget office, whose main concern is to keep all budget requests down. This attitude was most vividly demonstrated in the most recent legislative session in which the budget office demanded an across-the-board 15% retention of all departmental funds, to be released later only on special authorization. Following review in the budget office, the Governor's staff looks at budget allocations from a policy viewpoint. When austerity is the policy, all budgets suffer - those with the least powerful constituents the most. Higher education is probably a middle-level power among those competitors for state dollars.

Finally, the budget is submitted by the Governor to the legislature. Here, more tax-conscious budget paring goes on, more competition among constituencies, more policy decisions, and unless the constituencies are continuously

watchful, the budget items get eliminated. For an example of how this process can affect policy decisions, the University submitted a budget for 1972 for an expanded student body of 5300, which included a request for 53 additional faculty positions and 32 additional support personnel (support personnel includes everyone from administrative officers, such as deans, to janitors, furnace-men, and bursar's assistants). In the governor's office, this request was cut back to no faculty and 21 support personnel, mostly in physical maintenance. In the legislature, the faculty positions were restored - the legislators are serious about their commitment to the University and have consistently supported requests for academic positions - but the support personnel was cut back still further, to 8. The result is that in the new, much-lauded, College of Public and Community Service, the new Dean has been hired, seven of his faculty have been recruited and are working with him to plan the new curriculum, but these eight have only one secretary and she is months behind on her paperwork.

There is no way of anticipating what next year's legislature's response will be to the developing crisis in housing and transportation in relation to the opening of the Columbia Point campus. Ultimately, it will be the legislature that will have to authorize housing and transit facilities to relieve the burden on the community and make possible the utilization of the educational facilities in which the Commonwealth has already made a sizeable investment.

Why No Housing Market Analysis?

Controversy breeds criticism, and the decision by the Task Force not to participate in a Housing Market Analysis has led to enough criticism of this report, even before it had been published, and well before its contents were known, that we feel it is incumbent upon us here to indicate even more strongly the reasons for not going ahead with this analysis.

First of all, what is a Housing Market Analysis? Basically, a housing market analysis is used in the real estate business to determine what can be sold, to whom, and at what price. The technique involves examining present conditions, looking at what has happened in the past, making some assumptions about what factors will change in the near future, and then making an educated judgment or guess about what will probably happen in the particular case under investigation.

Sometimes data is assembled and analyzed; in other cases millions of dollars are invested on the basis of the informal judgment and experience of an expert in the field. The value of the analysis is in direct relation to how precisely the question to be answered was posed, and to the validity of the assumptions made.

In the Dorchester-Columbia Point situation, only a small part of the questions before the Task Force pertain to who is "selling" something to someone - that is, what kinds of housing will students and other University personnel "buy." Chapters 3 and 4 of this Report on the results of the Student, Faculty and Staff Surveys provides valuable answers to this question.

If a useful housing market analysis is to be produced, the rest of the questions to be answered must be much more carefully developed. In the context of a study of the housing impact of the opening of UMass's Columbia Point campus, other important functions of a housing analysis should be:

- a) To identify that housing which is likely to be rented to students. Which owners are likely to convert their property to student occupancy? Are they large owners, or small? Do they live in the community or not? What kind of housing - size, condition, location - is most likely to be converted?
- b) To identify the characteristics of the families in Dorchester who are likely to be displaced by student occupancy. Are they low-income or high-income? Are they owners or renters? Are they predominantly families of a certain size? or race? Will they move voluntarily, or will they be forced to move? What problems will they have finding other housing? Will it be easy or difficult for them to move?
- c) To identify other housing resources in the community which can be made available, under conditions acceptable to the community, to students or to families displaced by students (the purpose of this analysis is to exclude those vacancies deliberately created in order to take advantage of UMass-related demand). Are there vacant units that can be rehabilitated and returned to use, at a manageable cost? Are there units

expected to be vacated by people moving out of the community that would otherwise be left vacant or put to some unacceptable use?

- d) To identify the pattern of housing financing operating in the Dorchester community and any major modifications in housing conditions and ownership it has produced. Are mortgages for purchase and for upgrading available to community residents, or substantially limited to commercial landlords? Is consolidation of ownership encouraged or discouraged? Have mortgage rates varied within the same period of time on the basis of scale of ownership? Any other basis? Is public sector money (MHFA, HUD 235 and 236, etc.) available within this community? What is the availability of short-term high-interest financing for real estate speculation?
- e) To identify those factors which will make new housing designed for students compete successfully with existing neighborhood housing. At what price will students be attracted to student housing? What other characteristics of housing for student use are important and serve as competitive advantages over neighborhood housing? If new student housing is more expensive than converted neighborhood housing, can it be built close to the campus itself, and will that compensate for the price difference?
- f) To determine the existing need for housing (not counting that anticipated for students and displacees). Is there enough demand for market-rate housing in the community to keep units specially developed for students or displaced families occupied in the event of discontinuation of the subsidy programs under which they were built? Is there sufficient demand for market-rate housing to enable mixed developments in which higher rents in the market-rate units could be used to offset and reduce further the rents in low- and moderate-income units?
- g) To relate UMass Boston-generated housing demands to existing trends. What are the

patterns of in-migration and out-migration from the Dorchester-Columbia Point Community? Has there been substantial change in the level of home ownership in the area? Are there major changes underway in the ethnic and racial composition of the community's neighborhoods? in the income levels? Are rent levels in the neighborhoods relatively stable in relation to housing conditions, or are they escalating beyond general Boston area rent patterns? Will UMass-related housing demand reinforce any of these trends, or will it reverse them?

It is quite clear that an analysis of this magnitude is simply not possible in either the time-span available to the Task Force, nor within the limited funding available to the University.

It has been suggested that a cursory analysis of the housing market and supply in Dorchester could be carried out through examination of the 1970 census data on housing. Although it is the largest source of already assembled information on housing and housing market-related characteristics of households, the 1970 census has serious limitations. One important one is the inability to correlate census data with other kinds of information without enormous coding and data processing operations.

Another difficulty results from the decision by the Census Bureau not to classify units in the 1970 Census by condition, except to note those that lack plumbing. Although there were problems with the definitions used in earlier censuses, and with the skill of the enumerators at rating conditions of housing, the classifications could at least be cautiously used as an estimate of "substandard" housing. 1970 data does not include any information about the condition of housing units, thereby eliminating the utility of much of the information about vacancies, rent levels, and other factors. The number of housing units vacant in a given census tract is meaningless for most purposes until one knows how many of these units are in fact habitable. There is also no way of finding out who is living in substandard housing - not by size of family, nor by income, nor by race. There is no way to link any other information on housing conditions with census data. Finally, because definitions used in the 1970 Census were different from those used in the 1960 Census, it is impossible to be accurate in comparing data from the two.

It has also been proposed that an analysis be done of trends in the housing market, evaluating the use of data from telephone company and electric company installations, terminations and new accounts for analyzing housing trends. The goal is to learn about increased transiency, exodus from neighborhoods, and conversion of land from residential use to business use.

To begin with, trends in a housing market that has never had a large number of students, faculty, and other University-related housing "consumers" in it can hardly be expected to predict the behavior of that market once this group does enter it. Early changes which have occurred in anticipation of student housing demand in the few years since the Columbia Point site for the campus was chosen will not show up at all in the trend analysis, having occurred both too recently and too subtly. Other changes will not be reflected in trend data because activity has been deliberately concealed through illegal construction activity, and property purchase through straws, or because sources of much information about ownership and tenancies are not available in usable form over a long enough period to analyze trends.

But more important, in a situation like that anticipated in Dorchester and South Boston, trends can be interpreted in ways which could be highly damaging to the existing community. Trends which indicate changing or deteriorating neighborhoods can be used to support official inaction - the problem has been there all along, nothing new is happening.

Worse, a trend toward deterioration can be interpreted as a signal for the need for "improvement," and to view as a change for the better the imminent displacement of large numbers of residents through University-related influx.

A Housing Market Analysis which answered the questions posed at the beginning of this section would be of great value to the Task Force in assessing the impact of the University and developing constructive roles which the University, the Task Force, and other public and private actors could take. However, such analysis is costly, difficult, and time-consuming, and no one in either the public or private sector has offered to underwrite it. Trying to get around this by putting together an analysis out of figures generated by businesses like the telephone and electric companies having a "market" of their own to enhance will be seen by the community as being prejudiced from the start and will never be deemed objective.

The Task Force met with the University and other organizations on four different occasions to wrestle with the problem of an analysis of the Dorchester housing market. For all the reasons mentioned above, the Task Force has finally concluded that a first-rate issue-oriented Housing Market Analysis is, in this situation, not worth the money it costs. A Housing Market Analysis, with all the best will in the world, is only as good as the assumptions on which it is based, and the expert judgment that goes into the predictions made at the end. In the present situation, JGA and the Task Force have looked at the housing scene in Cambridge, in Allston-Brighton, and other areas of the metropolitan area which have been impacted by students, and have come to the conclusion that we are ready to act on the basis of our assumptions and judgment, rather than to put this expertise into further costly and long-term analysis.

One last note: when the Task Force was first asked to cooperate in a Housing Market Analysis which would be produced with the assistance of the telephone company, the gas company, the electric company and one of the local banks, the Task Force responded that there were major issues of housing impact in which these four businesses had participated and through which they had produced some of the very problems the residents were then coping with. Questions of policy were raised at that time, which have not yet been answered: Why can't the long-term modest-income resident get a home improvement loan? Why can't his son get a mortgage? Why is the landlord of his mother's decrepit home not compelled to repair the furnace so that she has heat in the winter? Why is his sister required to place a hefty deposit before she can get phone or gas or electric service, while his employer in the suburbs need not? Why does a developer of \$200/month apartments get a real estate tax break and an income tax break, while the low-income resident's tax burdens escalate uncontrollably?

Obviously, not all of these issues of equity are the responsibility of the four businesses which have offered their assistance. But dealing with those issues which are their responsibility is clearly more important than their participation in a Housing Market Analysis. The business community will do more to stabilize the Dorchester-Columbia Point community by reviewing the implications of their policies and changing those policies so as to provide a more constructive impact on the community.

CHAPTER II

THE COMMUNITY: DORCHESTER AND COLUMBIA POINT

Columbia Point is a part of Dorchester, but because of its physical isolation, its history and development have been quite different from the rest of the area. In this chapter, first the general area of Dorchester will be described, followed by the special characteristics of Columbia Point.

Dorchester is the largest of Boston's neighborhoods. Once, it stretched from the neck of the Boston peninsula to the Rhode Island border. At that time the predominant land use was farming. The rural character of Dorchester prevailed until the late 19th century when the development of crosstown rail service made it attractive for developers to build to suit the fast growing population. A building boom beginning in the 1870's and continuing into the early twentieth century, provided Dorchester with its housing stock of predominantly three decker structures, mixed with some fine examples of Victorian houses. The boom nearly exhausted the supply of developable land and most of the community's housing and neighborhoods are eighty to one hundred years old.

Population

(Including census tracts 900's and 1000-1011)

Dorchester comprises 8 square miles and 19% of the city's area. In Dorchester according to the 1970 census, there are 176,891 inhabitants, out of a total for the city of 641,071. Residents of Dorchester make up 27% of the population of Boston. This percentage has remained fixed over the past ten years as the movement of people from Dorchester has occurred at the same rate of decrease as for the city as a whole. In 1960 Dorchester had 186,639 of the city's total population of 698,081.

Dorchester is a young community with about 35% of its population under 18 years of age, compared to 27% of the city's population in that age range. It has lost substantial numbers of working age residents over the past 10 years with a 42% loss in the 25-34 age categories and a 21% loss in the 35-64 age category. The number of elderly residents decreased only slightly over the past ten years, and those over 65 still make up about 12% of the population of Dorchester.

The racial composition of Dorchester is changing rapidly. In 1960 there were 11,156 Blacks in Dorchester. In 1970 there are 48,622. Blacks comprise 25% of the population of Dorchester in 1970 and the percentage of other non-white groups has increased from .4% in 1960 to 1.3% in 1970. However, classifying Dorchester as 25% Black gives a misleading idea of distribution. About 90% of the Black population live in two small areas - Columbia Point and a sector west of Columbia Road, Norfolk Street and Washington Street.

Presently the median family income in Dorchester is just the same as for the city at \$9133. In 1960, the median income in Dorchester, \$6200, was higher than the city's \$5700. Some of this change is reflected in the percentage of the present population whose income is below the poverty level, 15.9% as compared with 11.7% for the city. In Dorchester 16.2% of the families are receiving some type of public assistance.

Housing

About half of the housing stock in Dorchester is made up of three and four unit structures. About one-third of the dwelling units in Dorchester are owner-occupied.

There has been a slight increase of 3% in the total number of housing units in Dorchester in the past 10 years, from 56217 in 1960 to 57122 in 1970. The increase occurred in the construction of single and two-family dwellings in the southern neighborhoods and of apartments in the northern neighborhoods.

Dorchester's housing stock is old. Over 90% was built before 1939. Although the 1970 census

did not classify housing conditions comparable with 1960, we can deduce that some increase in deteriorating and dilapidated structures contributed to the increase in the vacancy rate from 3.5% in 1960 to 6.2% in 1970.

While more than half of the households have lived in Dorchester for at least five years, 34% of the households have been there for less than 2 years. Compared to 1960, the number of families who had lived in Dorchester for 2 years or less had increased by 28.8%.

Rents paid in Dorchester cannot be characterized accurately with a general median figure. A median for the City of Boston in 1970 is quoted at \$98 but in the census tracts of Dorchester the median rents range from \$74-\$163.

Columbia Point

Although Columbia Point is one of the neighborhoods of Dorchester, it differs in many important ways from the rest of the area. To begin with, the only housing on Columbia Point is public housing, a large high-rise development that typifies the most glaring mistakes made in the nation's efforts to house the poor. There is no other public housing in Dorchester -- it is all on Columbia Point.

The peninsula is primarily filled land. At the entrance to the development, there is a large shopping center which is almost entirely closed down. Many agencies have offices in apartments in the housing development including a Pre-school program, the Neighborhood House, the Welfare Dept., the Area Planning and Action Council, a Spanish Center and a large Neighborhood Health Center. Since the neighborhood is mostly the development itself, there is a Catholic church, a primary school and a middle school located on surrounding property.

Columbia Point was built in 1954. The development is made up of 27 buildings, both low-level three story and seven story high rise, and holds 1397 apartments. It sits on 35 acres of open and flat space,

for a density of 43 units per acre. This density is misleading, however, as the buildings are all located very close together, with large empty land areas surrounding them. The feeling of being penned in predominates. The cost of original construction was \$13,337 per unit. Today, major repairs, including elevators, incinerators, painting, site improvement and waterproofing would cost an estimated \$6,000,000.

Columbia Point has the highest crime rate among the developments in Boston. Vandalism and theft are the most common crimes but the number of violent crimes is increasing. Under these circumstances it is no wonder that the tenants have been demanding more and better security measures.

The current population of Columbia Point is approximately 5000. About 50% of the population are school age children in the 5-20 age range. Of the 894 families living at Columbia Point, 498 are female headed households. All of the families are considered low income with a median income in 1970 of \$4157. 240 families have incomes of \$3000 or less a year. 76% of all the families receive some form of public assistance.

Housing at Columbia Point has the highest rate of overcrowding in Dorchester. More than a quarter of the units average more than 1.01 persons per room. This compares with about 9.1% overcrowding in Dorchester as a whole and 7.6% for the City. Since rents are calculated as a percentage of income and subsidized by the government, it is not surprising that the median rent at Columbia Point is the lowest in Dorchester.

The racial composition of Columbia Point has changed greatly in the past 15 years. When the development opened, Blacks made up only 6.8% of the population. By 1960 this had increased to 11%. In 1964, 38% of all occupied units housed blacks. Currently, about 60% of the development is black.

While 40% of the population is over 18 years old, only 14.5% are employed and unemployment at Columbia Point is very high.

The opening of the campus at Columbia Point is seen by residents of Columbia Point and Dorchester as both a threat and an opportunity. Both communities are afraid of losing their homes, but eager to reap the benefits of educational facilities and employment opportunities close at hand. Both communities will be irreversibly changed by the opening of the University. The question that remains is, will it be for the better?

CHAPTER III

THE STUDENT SURVEY

Both the University and the Task Force agreed at the outset that the opening of the Columbia Point campus would create an impact on the Dorchester and Columbia Point communities. However, there was considerable disagreement as to the magnitude of this impact and its effect on housing conditions in the communities. Central to this study, therefore, is an attempt to measure and describe this impact.

The survey attempts to find answers to these questions: How many students live at home with their parents, and who are they? Why do they live at home? And for what reasons do they leave home?

How many students do not live with their parents? Are they different from those students living at home? Where do they live, and in what kind of a setting - with other students, with a spouse and children, or alone? Why do they live there? Where do they think they will live if and when they attend school at Columbia Point?

Which students are most likely to move in response to the changing location of the campus and how many? Which new students are most likely to seek housing close to campus and how many?

How do students get to campus now? How will they get to the Columbia Point campus? Will the resulting changes in commuting time make any difference as to whether students live away from home and where they move?

How much money do students have? How much do they spend for housing? What kind of housing do they prefer to live in? Would they live in student housing on Columbia Point?

How will the proposed enrollment growth at the Columbia Point campus affect the impact of students on the community?

To get the answers to these questions, it was proposed last May that the Task Force's consultant work with the University's Survey Research Program in the design of a

student survey which would then be carried out by the Survey Research Program. Inasmuch as classes were already over for the summer, there was concern that students might not be available to participate in such a survey.

Therefore, prior to work on design of a survey, a small preliminary random sampling of students from the University Directory was carried out, and interviewers contacted this sample by telephone to see if an adequate percentage of students could be reached to carry out a survey. These students were not questioned; they were only asked if they could be reached at this number later in the summer, or if someone at this number would be able to refer the interviewer on to another number at which the respondent could be reached. The preliminary effort was highly successful, and 80% of the pre-sample was reached within five days.

The decision was therefore made to go ahead with the survey and members of JGA, the Survey Research Program and the Task Force sat down together to begin its design. On one point the community members were adamant - the survey should serve to introduce the community's problems to the students and should not, itself, compound these problems by stimulating interest in living in the community where such interest did not already exist. This constraint imposed a considerable burden on the survey design, and in one case led to the elimination of a question, "Would you consider living in the Columbia Point housing development if eligible?" because the residents of the development had not yet come to a decision as to whether they wished to encourage or discourage occupancy by eligible students.

Meanwhile, the process of developing a random sample was underway. The sample initially was to consist of three parts: 500 students at UMass Boston in 1971-72; 100 people who had been accepted for admission to UMass Boston for Fall, 1972, and who had notified the University of their acceptance and paid their deposit; and a third group of 50 graduate students from Northeastern University who were to represent the 2500 future graduate students at the Columbia Point campus. This third group was later abandoned; first, because Northeastern felt it could not violate its institutional policy of not giving out or publishing students' names and addresses, and second, because UMass Boston had made a preliminary decision to drop the graduate program on all but a very minor scale. It was further decided to oversample the married students because they made up a rather small percentage of the overall student body; yet it was expected that, because none of them lived with their parents, their residential pattern would shed additional light on the housing behavior of students in

general. The final sample included 448 of last year's students, 89 of whom were married according to the records, and 80 entering freshmen.

Pretesting of the survey instrument took place in late June and interviewing of respondents was carried out in July. An introductory letter written by the Task Force to respondents, telling them about the Survey and requesting their cooperation, and the Survey Questionnaire, will be found in Appendix C. Seventy-five percent of respondents were reached in the first week. With intensive follow-up, including a second mailing which urged respondents to telephone the Survey Research Program office, collect if need be, an additional 5% were reached for an overall response rate of 80%, or 418 interviews - just about what the preliminary sampling had led us to expect. Virtually all the respondents were cooperative, and several expressed interest in making contact with the Task Force.

Computer work began in late July and has continued until very recently. This work was also carried out by the Survey Research Program on a more independent basis than the survey design. Some problems developed in relation to the slow pace of delivery of data and obtaining corrections. However, the results have been most informative in developing a body of data on which the Task Force can base its recommendations. It will continue to serve as a valuable resource in developing more detailed plans for meeting student housing needs.

Who are the students?

(Interviewing was carried out in July, 1972. Therefore, the class designations in this report refer to the class level during the academic year 1971-72. Those students referred to as "entering freshmen" are now presumably enrolled as freshmen in the school, while those referred to as "seniors" have in all likelihood graduated and are not students at UMB any longer.)

UMass Boston is an undergraduate college with 4,800 students, only a negligible number of whom are graduate students. The average student at UMass Boston is 21 years old and three-fourths of his fellows fall in the normal college age range: 18-23. However, there is an unusually large older student group, with almost a fifth of the student body being 25 years of age or older. There is some variation among the classes with respect to age. Last year's sophomore class appeared to be somewhat younger than the other classes, and this year's entering freshmen appear to be repeating that phenomenon. There are approximately the same number of

men and women, and 14% of the student body is married, mostly men. Forty-three percent of the married students had dependents living with them and so did 7% of the unmarried students (who are presumably widowed, divorced or separated). Over 90% are white.

Eighty-three percent of the students carried a full course schedule both terms. Half the married students worked and almost three-quarters of the unmarried students worked. Only three-quarters of last year's students intend to return to school this year; since 17% were seniors this indicates that 10% of last year's freshmen, sophomores and juniors (8% of last year's student body) were not planning to return this year.

Sixty-three entering freshmen were interviewed. We have some concern that, although this group was chosen through a random sample of students who had in June paid their deposit and indicated that they would definitely attend UMass Boston in the fall, it nevertheless may not accurately represent the full variety of freshmen. Our attention has been drawn to this issue by the Registrar's office, which noted the discrepancy between the sex breakdown of the sample (57% women and 43% men) and the final registration figures which indicate an equal number of women and men. This means that those students who were ready to commit themselves in June do not represent the entire class, and that those who committed themselves in July, August and September include more men, and perhaps more older students. The implications of this suspected skew in the sample are that conclusions based on this sample are, on the one hand, less reliable than for the last year's student sample, but that, on the other hand, the conclusions probably err on the conservative side since the sample is made up of the younger and more traditional elements of a freshman college class.

Most of the entering freshmen (79%) are under nineteen years old, the normal age for a freshman class. Ten percent are married. Fifty-eight percent of the entering freshmen plan definitely to work while at school and another twenty-five percent may work, depending on the circumstances. Virtually all of these plan to work part-time.

Where do the students come from and where do they live? What determines whether they live at home with their parents or not?

(Locations will be described as Far North, Far West, Far South, Near North, Near West and Near South, Boston, and Boston and Core. The Near suburbs are those within a

10-mile radius. The Far suburbs are within a 10-25 mile radius. Boston refers to the city itself, and Boston and Core includes the three cities of Boston, Cambridge and Somerville.)

All but 4% of the students, new and old, come from the Boston metropolitan area, 76% from within a 10-mile radius of the city and 35% list the city of Boston as their home address (Figure 1). Dorchester and Cambridge are the most frequented communities, with 8% of the students listing Dorchester as their home address and 6% listing Cambridge.

FIGURE 1

	Home Address (%)	Stdts Lived Last Year (%)	Entering Freshmen Expected Res. '72 (%)	Will Live While Attending UMB Col. Pt. '73	
				1st Ch. (%)	2nd Ch. (%)
Far North	4	2	3	3	1
Far West	4	6	2	2	1
Far South	10	9	8	6	1
Near South	5	4	6	5	3
Near West	13	11	14	10	7
Near North	23	24	18	20	9
(Cambridge)	(6)	(8)	(3)	(8)	(6)
(Somerville)	(3)	(3)	(5)	(3)	(1)
Boston	35	41	49	47	33
(Dorchester)	(8)	(7)	(12)	(13)	(7)
(Near Campus)				(4)	(5)
Mass	4				

The term "Home Address" is deceptive; many students living independently do not give their parents' address when "Home Address" is requested at Registration. Especially for students coming from out-of-state, there is considerable financial incentive to transfer one's official residence to where one lives to go to school. That way, a student pays the \$200 annual tuition charge for Massachusetts students. By maintaining his out-of-state home address, he would be billed the \$812 (now \$1,069.) annual tuition for non-Massachusetts residents.

The area called Near North has the highest concentration of students outside Boston - 24% of last year's students in general, 29% of the young unmarried students, and 37% of the married students. This may be because the area contains three cities with heavy student populations in general - Cambridge, Somerville and Medford.

It is interesting to note, however, that far fewer entering freshmen plan to live in the Near North suburbs (13%) than present students, and only 3% expect to live in Cambridge.

Also, 8% of last year's students list Dorchester as their home address, but only 7% lived there during the last school year. However, 12% of the entering freshmen expect to live in Dorchester during their freshman year, almost as high as the 13% of the student body who expect to live in Dorchester (plus the 4% who would live "Near" to campus) when the Columbia Point campus opens.

It appears that this year's freshman class is already showing the effects of the move to Columbia Point and is basing its decision on where to live on the anticipated opening of that campus next year. It also indicates that if the campus were open today, over 400 additional students from UMass Boston would be living in Dorchester, than were last year.

<u>Last year's students</u>	<u>Entering Freshmen</u>
13% will live in Dorch. while in school at CP	12% expect to live in Dorch. this year
+ 4% will live close to <u>17%</u> school	<u>12%</u>
- 7% lived in Dorch. last <u> </u> year	- <u>8%</u> come from Dorch.
=10% of 3600 Sophs., Jr., <u> </u> & Srs. will move	= 4% of 1400 Fr. will <u> </u> move
= 360 plus	= 56
	=416

Of last year's students:

59% lived at home with their parents (including
68% of the unmarried students)
13% lived with their spouse in their own home,
of whom

6% lived alone together (2 person household)	300 d.u.*
3% had one child (3 person household)	150 d.u.
3% had two+ children (4+ person household)	150 d.u.
8% lived alone (one person hshold)	400 d.u.
17% shared a place with other students, of whom	
7% shared with one person (2 person household)	(350)175 d.u.
6% shared with two people (3 person household)	(300)100 d.u.
4% shared with three or more (4+ person household)	(200) <u>50 d.u.</u>
	1325 d.u.

*d.u. = dwelling unit

For simplicity's sake, we will assume the present student body to number an even 5,000. Assuming that unmarried students are sharing households exclusively with other UMass Boston students (and this is not likely), this means that 1325 dwelling units in the Boston area are now occupied by UMB students who are not living at home with their parents.

Eighty percent of the students who share housing with other students live in Boston and Cambridge, 29% of them in the Back Bay and South End, the two communities closest to the present campus.

Of the entering freshmen:

80% plan to live at home with their parents,
including 92% of the freshmen under 19 years old
6% will live with their spouse and children
9% plan to live with other students
3% plan to live alone

In other words, 12% of the 1400 entering freshmen (or 168) may be entering the housing market.

Of the unmarried students, 68% live at home. Of these:

Under 19	19-20	21 & Over	
85%	86%	50%	Live at home
67%	75%	76%	Do so because it costs less
14%	11%	10%	Do so because it's comfortable & pleasant
7%	5%	3%	Do so because it's close to school

In rating the next most important reason for living at home, there was almost no difference among the age groups who all rated financial reasons, comfort, and congeniality with their family around 15%. Closeness to school was mentioned only about 8%, even though 31% of the students who lived at home with their parents lived in Boston and an additional 4% lived in Cambridge, 4% in Somerville, and many others in inner suburbs highly accessible to the present campus.

On the other hand, when those students not living at home were asked why they lived away they replied:

	To be independent	To be close to school
Live alone	38%	22%
Share with students	52%	22%

The second reason for living away from home, for 15% of the students, was independence, and 10% of students sharing housing with other students mentioned environmental factors such as libraries, the student scene, "good neighborhood," safe neighborhood and the like.

Students living with their spouse and/or children were asked why they had chosen the particular location in which they were living. Three factors were mentioned with almost equal frequency:

- 23% felt environmental factors were the most important
- 22% said cost was the most compelling
- 20% said comfort and a good apartment were most important


Finally, how a student lives varies somewhat with his class level, and strongly with his age. There is little variation by class level in the percentages of students living alone (7-9%) or sharing housing with other students (15-19%). However, 70% of freshmen and sophomores live at home, but only 54% of juniors and 48% of seniors. And while 7% of the freshmen and sophomore class are married and living with their spouse and/or children, 18% of the juniors and 24% of the seniors live with spouse and/or children.

Age is even more closely related. Fifty-five percent of the students living at home with their parents are under 21, and 75% are under 23. Small numbers of 18 and 19 year olds are sharing housing with other students, but beginning with 20 year olds, roughly 20% of each age group shares housing with other students. Living alone is the least common residence style (only 8% of the student body). Students begin to live alone at age 21, it reaches its greatest frequency at age 24 (29% of the students), and then drops off again.

Students begin to get married and set up house at age 20, and by 21, 10% of the students are living with spouse and/or children. At age 24, 20% are married, and of the 4% of the student body who are 31 and older, 76% are living with their spouse and/or children.

And when one examines class level and age and residence style all together, it seems pretty clear that almost 40% of one group of students will surely move during their college years - those students who enter college at the conventional age of 17 to 19 and live at home are very likely to leave home when they begin their junior year, at age 20 or 21 (Figure 2). This group of 2800 conventionally-aged students constitutes 56% of UMass Boston students. If

FIGURE 2



40% of them (or 1100 students) move out of their homes in mid-college, simply because they are growing up and some are getting married, it seems reasonable to anticipate that most of them will move to an area from which the Columbia Point campus is easily accesible. And, given the short time it takes to turn an area into a swinging student area (viz. Allston-Brighton), it will not be long before many of these students are moving into Dorchester.

Housing Costs

Looking only at those students who do not live at home with their families, 80% spend between \$500 - \$2000 on housing last year. Those students sharing housing with other students spend the least - almost 3/5 of them spent between \$500 - \$1000 last year, and almost 1/5 of them spent under \$500 for the year's housing. However, when one multiplies what each student spent by the number of people with whom he shared his apartment, the students sharing apartments with other students rented higher-priced housing than any other students in our sample.

	<u>Spent On Housing</u>						
	\$100- \$499	\$500- \$999	\$1000- \$1999	\$2000- \$2999	\$3000- \$3999	\$4000- \$4999	\$5000 +
<u>Students Living:</u> (%)							
alone	5	42	46	2	-	-	5
w.spouse	5	10	64	14	3	-	4
w.stdnts	19	58	23	-	-	-	-
<u>Apts. occupied by:</u> (%)							
1 stdnt	5	42	46	2	-	-	5
mrd. couple	5	10	64	14	3	-	4
more than 1 stdnt	7	9	36	29	13	3	3
Based on 5000 stdnts, # apts. occupied by stdnts <u>not</u> living w. parents:	68	224	640	180	56	8	48

Money

Money is a very real consideration for virtually all UMass Boston students. Three-quarters of all students living at home say the most important reason for doing so is financial. Eighty-five percent of all students and entering freshmen say that the low tuition was a major factor in the choice of UMass Boston. Seventy-two percent of the students say that their parents did not give them any money during the last school year.

There seems to be a considerable difference in minimum earnings needed by last year's students who expect to continue in school this year, and by this year's entering freshmen.

Of returning students	Of entering freshmen	
11%	12%	do not need to earn anything
33%	62%	must earn \$1 - \$999 this year
19%	11%	" \$1000-\$1999 "
15%	5%	" \$2000-\$2999 "
6%	5%	" \$3000-\$3999 "
4%	2%	" \$4000-\$4999 "
4%	2%	" \$5000 - or more

There are also significant differences among the four residence groups with regard to how much money students need, its sources, and how it is spent.

INCOME

Of those who live:	Worked last yr. full-time	Earned during school yr				Earned during vacation				
		Worked	\$1-500	500-999	1000-2999	3000-4999	5000+	\$1-499	500-999	1000-2999
alone (%)	80	17	4	10	47	10	4	7	11	43
w.parents (%)	76	9	15	15	33	7	2	17	31	28
w.stdnts (%)	75	13	9	19	35	11	4	10	23	33
w.spouse &/or kids (%)	49	6	5	6	22	7	4	5	7	24

Of those who answered the question:

Who live:	Need to Earn				Need total income of:				
	\$0-999	1000-1999	2000-2999	3000-4999	5000+	<\$1000	1000-2999	3000-4999	5000+
alone (%)	4	3	17	37	5	2	39	44	13
w.parents (%)	11	48	18	13	1	16	54	19	9
w.stdnts (%)	12	10	37	16	2	6	46	32	12
w.spouse &/or kids (%)	27	21	4	14	19	2	11	20	63

Other Kinds of Income

	From Parents		Scholarships		Savings		Borrowed					
	\$0-500	>500	\$0-500	>500	\$0-500	>500	\$0-500	>500				
alone	78	14	7	85	2	12	72	19	9	92	3	4
w.parents	71	18	9	77	18	5	60	32	8	87	3	10
w.stdnts	73	6	20	77	12	12	61	21	18	76	8	16
w.spouse &/or kids	91	2	6	81	9	10	56	24	20	75	4	21

Transportation and Commuting

As stated earlier, commuting patterns of students are being looked at to determine first, what kinds of commuting the students now find acceptable, so as to design better new transportation links to Columbia Point; second, to see if there is any relationship between commuting patterns and choice of housing location; third, to see if this information helps us predict which students might be more likely to move closer to the Columbia Point campus; and fourth, to collect some additional data which may help assess how many students will be coming to the campus by each of the modes.

Fifty-seven percent of last year's students had cars or had access to a car. This figure does not vary significantly with age, but it does vary with residence and marital status.

	Has Car or Access To Car	<u>Uses Car To Get To School</u>			
		Always	Usually	Sometimes	Never
Unmarried, under 21 (%)	60	14	4	7	34
" , 21+	(%) 51	27	6	5	12
Married, under 25 (%)	54	16	3	5	30
" , 25+	(%) 71	30	2	9	30
Alone (%)	37	10	8	-	18
W. Parents (%)	60	23	5	7	25
W. Students (%)	39	16	-	8	13
W. Spouse &/or kids (%)	75	29	7	7	29
All last year's students (%)	57	22	5	6	23

Fifty-three percent of last year's students usually commuted by MBTA and seven percent by other public transportation. Nine percent walked to school, including eighteen percent of those who lived with other students and thirty-one percent of those who lived alone. Other modes, such as biking, car-pooling, getting a regular ride and hitching, were hardly mentioned (altogether, only 5.6%).

Students commuted to school during rush hour, with over 55% leaving home between 7:30-9:30 AM. It is a long trip, taking:

8%	students	under 15 minutes
26%	"	15-29 minutes
30%	"	30-44 minutes
20%	"	45-59 minutes
17%	"	over 1 hour

Students commuting twice a day at \$.25/trip for 200 days would spend \$100/year on commuting expenses and, in fact, the largest percentage of students do spend between \$100-\$200/year commuting. Married students and students living at home with their families have the highest commuting expenses, probably because they tend to live further from school and are less accessible to public transit. Students living alone spend the least, which is consistent with what we have learned about their housing location - largely Beacon Hill, Back Bay, and the South End - and their transportation mode, walking.

Living:		Under \$100	\$100- \$199	\$200- \$299	\$300- \$399	\$400- +
Alone	(%)	62	14	13	5	5
W.Parents	(%)	18	34	20	14	14
W.Stdnts	(%)	33	28	17	7	16
W.Spouse &/or kids	(%)	12	34	18	23	13

When asked what a reasonable commuting time was, the students responded:

4%	students	under 15 minutes
29%	"	15-29 minutes
38%	"	30-44 minutes
21%	"	45-59 minutes
9%	"	over 1 hour

When asked about what are possible and acceptable ways to commute to school:

70% say it is possible and acceptable to commute by car
 91% MBTA, with no changes
 86% MBTA, with one change
 42% MBTA, with two changes
 36% MBTA, with walk of more than 15 minutes, at each end
 20% Bike
 12% Walk

With regard to an acceptable one-way commuting cost:

98% will pay under \$.25 (12% say under \$.25 acceptable)
 86% will pay \$.25 - \$.49 (42% say \$.25-\$.49 acceptable)
 44% will pay \$.50 - \$.74 (25% say \$.50-\$.74 acceptable)
 19% will pay \$.75 - \$.99 (10% say \$.75-\$.99 acceptable)
 9% will pay over \$1.00

Combining acceptable public transportation modes with reasonable commuting time, an interesting pattern emerges. Almost everyone is willing to commute up to half-an-hour, and to make one change (that is, to ride one or two vehicles); two-thirds are willing to travel up to three-quarters of an hour and to make one change. Just under half are willing to make two changes and, under these circumstances, they will only travel for half-an-hour. And between a quarter and two-fifths of the students are willing to travel up to an hour, with one change, or up to three-quarters of an hour with two changes or a long walk at the end.

<15 min 15-29 30-44 45-59 1 hr.+

(% of the entire sample)

One vehicle, no changes:	99	95	67	27	8
One change:	94	90	65	29	8
Two changes:	47	47	36	18	6
W. 15" walk:	40	39	30	14	5

Combining the mode students use to commute and the time it takes them, we find that only 9% of the students walk to school, but that they constitute 1/2 of those who travel less than fifteen minutes; almost all of the walkers travel under half an hour. Drivers spend slightly less time commuting than do MBTA riders, but this is not substantial. Fifteen percent travel over an hour, including 18% of the MBTA riders and 40% of the other transit riders.

		15"	15-29"	30-44"	45-1 hr.	1 hr.+	
Car	(%)	5	30	36	20	10	27%
MBTA	(%)	4	22	33	22	18	52%
Other							
pub.trans.	(%)	5	31	3	21	40	6%
Walk	(%)	46	41	4	2	7	9%
Bike	(%)	-	55	36	-	9	2%
Car Pool	(%)	-	-	*	-	-	1%
Reg.Ride	(%)	-	-	-	*	*	*
Hitch	(%)	-	38	38	25	-	3%
		8%	27%	30%	20%	15%	

* Too few to include in percentile

Many more students have cars or access to a car than use them to commute. Generally speaking, one-third of Boston students have a car, and two-thirds of suburban students do.

Four-hundred and fifty students (9%) walk to school, including 42% of the students living in the Back Bay, 60% from Beacon Hill, and 69% from the South End. These students also pay the lowest rents and have no cars. It seems reasonable to assume that many will try to move to within walking distance of the campus when it moves to Columbia Point.

We suggest that 6% is a reasonable estimate of the number of students who will move for this reason.

It is interesting to look at how the students commute from those areas of heaviest student concentration:

	% of Stdnt Body	% Using T	% Using Car	
Dorchester	7%	70%	22%	
Cambridge	8%	68%	24%	
Back Bay	6%	47%	5%	42% walk (60% Beacon
South End	6%	26%	6%	69% walk Hill walks)
Somerville	3%	68%	21%	
Medford	3%	70%	30%	
Brighton	3%	58%	21%	21% Hitch
S. Boston	3%	50%	13%	
Jamaica Plain	2%	93%	7%	
Roxbury	2%	60%	8%	16% other pub. trans.
Roslindale	2%	57%	14%	14% other pub. trans.
Weymouth	2%	70%	17%	
Brookline	2%	38%	31%	31% Hitch
Watertown	2%	64%	36%	
Weymouth	2%	70%	17%	
Woburn	2%	40%	60%	
Newton	2%	50%	50%	
Quincy & Wollaston	2%	100%	-	

A similar analysis of commuting patterns from the suburbs shows a pattern clearly derived from the adequacy of public transportation services to the area. The western suburbs are hardly served by the MBTA at all, and other bus and train service is also minimal, most of it running at routine commuting times only. The far northern suburbs, on the other hand, while only minimally served by the MBTA, do receive modest but reasonable service from the Boston and Maine Railroad. The far south has access to the Red Line of the MBTA and the near south is served by it too, thus reducing reliance on cars even more than in Boston itself, where areas like Readville are as poorly served by public transportation as some of the outlying suburbs. The message is clear - where there is public transportation, the students will use it.

	% Using T	% Using Other Pub.Trans.	% Using Car	% Of Stdnt Body
Far North	13	27	40	3
Far West	19	14	67	6
Far South	49	4	41	9
Near South	76	8	8	4
Near West	51	2	35	12
Near North	58	4	32	25
Boston	59	3	14	43

At Columbia Point

Overall, 62% of the entire sample and 64% of last year's students have been in the Columbia Point area. Interestingly, the only categories of students in which fewer than half have ever been in the Columbia Point area are older married students (44%) and older entering freshmen (43%)

Fifty-six percent of the entire sample expects to be at UMass Boston in 1973 at the Columbia Point campus, including 51% of last year's students.

In general, there is little difference between the answers of those students who do expect to go to school at Columbia Point in 1973 (mostly entering freshmen, last year's freshmen and sophomores) and those who told us what they would do if they were going to school there (mainly last year's juniors and seniors). Both groups were asked where they think they would live if they were there at that time. Forty-three percent expect to live at home with their parents, a 14% drop from now, and more significantly an 8% drop from the 51% of last year's juniors and seniors who lived at home (reasoning that four of the five classes answering this question would be juniors, seniors, or older by 1973).

Those students who lived at home last year and plan to go to Columbia Point next year were asked their residence plans. Seventy-five percent intend to live at home, 15% intend to live with students, 7% intend to live alone, and 4% expect to get married and live with their spouse. Everyone who intends to live at home while at Columbia Point

is now living at home. Examining where these students' homes are, in relation to whether they intend to move, shows a clear relationship between likelihood of moving and distance from the campus, modified by transportation accessibility.

Last yr's stdnts lived:	3/4 last yr's stdnts who lived at home expect to live at home in '73, and will live:	Other 1/4 last yr's stdnts who lived at home expect to share housing w. stdnts in '73, & will live:
3% Far North	2% Far North	8% Far North
4% Far West	7% Far West	15% Far West
9% Far South	12% Far South	
4% Near South	9% Near South	
12% Near West	12% Near West	15% Near West
25% Near North	25% Near North	23% Near North
43% Boston	31% Boston	38% Boston

Students living at home in the Far North and West, where public transportation is poorest, are most likely to leave home to share with students (presumably closer to campus). Students from Boston, the Near West suburbs (Green Line), and the Near North (Red, Blue & Orange Lines), show a moderate tendency to move. Only from the South, where the new Red Line offers much-sought service, and from which the new campus is nearer than the old, is there no evidence of a tendency to move into town from home.

About 7% of the student body, or 350 students, lived in Dorchester last year. The proportion of students living at home or away from home is quite similar to the entire student body, although fewer students shared accommodations with other students in Dorchester than in general. Sixty-four percent of the students lived at home. However, when the Columbia Point campus opens in 1973, 12% of the students intend to live in Dorchester, only half of whom will be living at home. This means that, with no increase in the student body, three times as many students as last year will be living either alone or with other students in Dorchester in 1973, if they are attending UMass Boston at Columbia Point. (Last year, 18% of 7%, or 1.2%; 1973, 32% of 12%, or 3.6%).

Last Year Lived:	Last Yr. Lived In Dorchester (7% stdnts) %	Expect To Live In Dorch '73 (12% stdnts) %	All Students	
			Last Yr. %	Expect '73 %
Alone	9	16	8	11
W.Parents	64	50	58	47
W.Stdnts	9	16	17	27
W.Spouse &/or kids	14	10	13	15

Or, to look at it differently, of all the students living alone last year, 8% lived in Dorchester; but of the students who expect to be living alone when the campus opens in 1973, 25% expect to live in Dorchester. A similar, but less dramatic, shift occurs among those students who lived last year with other students. Four percent of them lived in Dorchester, compared with 12% who expect to be living there in 1973. The other groups also anticipate living in Dorchester in greater numbers, but it is not so pronounced.

Of Those Who Lived: (%)	Last Yr Lived in Dorchester (7% all stdnts)	Expect to Live in Dorchester '73 (12% all stdnts)
Alone	8	25
W.Parents	8	10
W.Stdnts	4	12
W.Spouse	7	8

Beyond Dorchester, with regard to where students think they would live if they were at school at Columbia Point in 1973, the answers are quite consistent throughout the sample, irrespective of age, marital status, or present class level or residence. The largest group plan to live in the city of Boston - it is the first choice of 41% of the sample and the 2nd choice of 26%. Included in these groups are the 12% who plan to live in Dorchester and another 6.6% whose 2nd choice is Dorchester. An additional 4% said they expected to live close to campus.

The second most popular area is the Near North suburbs, including Cambridge. Twenty percent of the sample expect to live in the Near North, 7.5% in Cambridge. Third area in frequency noted is the central or Near West suburbs, with 19% of the sample planning to live there.

Given the general consistency of locations mentioned, it is interesting to note that there is striking variation among different groups with regard to the reasons for choosing these places. All groups agree that the most important reasons are a good environment, although this is defined differently by different groups, reasonable cost and closeness to school.

	Whole Sample	All Frshmn	Fr. < 19 (3/4 all Frshmn)	Unmarried			All Married
				< 19	19-20	> 21 (43%)	
Environment	29%	18%	15%	11%	27%	34%	36%
Money	19%	18%	13%	6%	18%	22%	19%
Close to School	18%	30%	34%	28%	22%	13%	10%

Among the married students, closeness to work or transportation to work is as important as closeness to school (10%), followed by closeness to transportation (8%) and general convenience (7%).

There is not so much difference among the residence groups in the relative importance they give to their reasons for choosing a location in which to live.

	Alone %	With Parents %	With Students %	With Spouse %
Environmental Factors:	43	26	46	29
Money:	22	17	24	25
Closeness to School:	18	19	10	7

Married students also value general convenience (12%), closeness to work (10%), closeness to transportation (8%),

and general comfort (6%). When asked for their 2nd reason, the same three factors came out 1st, 2nd and 3rd, although with less response.

Will Students Live in Student Housing?

Thirty-six percent of the sample, overall, would live in all-student housing. In terms of age, the breakdown shows:

	under 19	19-20	21-22	23-24	over 25
Would live in stdnt housing:	43%	39%	41%	32%	34%

This would indicate a gross market for student housing for 1800 people. It is important for the housing impact analysis to note the drop in interest that seems to occur between ages 22 and 23, because we have seen earlier that it is at ages 20 and 21 that the juniors move away from home. However, a third of the students 23 and over are willing to live in student housing, a sizeable number.

	<u>Of those students who last year lived:</u>			
	Alone	W.Parents	W.Students	W.Spouse
Would live in stdnt housing:	41%	37%	43%	29%

While these figures do not indicate that a majority of any group would live in student housing, the numbers involved here are large:

- 37% of 3000 students now living at home = 1110
- 43% of 850 students now living w. other students = 367
- 29% of 600 married students = 174
- 41% of 400 students living alone = 164

There is a substantial "market" here - 705 students now living away from home who are willing to live in the right kind of student housing, plus whatever fraction of the 1110 who must move away from home.

What kind of housing is appropriate? Here the answer is overwhelming. Virtually all students prefer apartments - the greatest number would like apartments with some common facilities, such as lounges and other meeting places. A smaller number, particularly the older students, prefer apartments with no common facilities. Surprisingly few are interested in a common dining facility. About 15%, mostly younger students living at home, would like dormitories of varying composition, but this seems like a poor investment except on a very small scale. However, it might be possible to build one small conventional dormitory facility for those students who are looking for that kind of life - 15% of 5000 is 750.

	Apt. w. Common Facil. %	Apt.w. Comm. DR & Facil. %	Dorm w. Suite %	Double Dorm Room %	Single Dorm Room %
Prefer:	27%	37%	18%	5%	7%

The students want student housing built on Columbia Point itself. This makes sense - since the reason many of them are interested in student housing is because it is hard, and takes a long time, to get to the campus, it is quite appropriate that housing facilities be built close by, avoiding the traffic problem altogether.

When asked who should manage student housing, the largest group (55%) preferred student cooperative management, because the housing would then be run in the student's interest. A fair number preferred University management:

	Alone	With Parents	With Students	With Spouse
Prefer Univ. Management:	11%	28%	13%	22%
	Under 20		21 and Over	
	34%		15%	

and very few reject University management as being unfair or inappropriate. Despite the willingness to live in student housing on Columbia Point, it is clear that it is students now living at home who are most attracted to the separate student housing image. All others would prefer

mixed community housing, given a choice. Furthermore, given the emphasis all the respondents place on various environmental factors, much work will have to be done both socially and physically on the site to keep interest in living on site as high as it is now.

It should be pointed out at this juncture that there is some disagreement among analysts whether more reliable results are obtained in a survey of this kind by asking respondents what they will do in the future, or by looking at respondents who are similar to the group whose future behavior is being predicted and projecting their answers. We have done both in this survey, and for the most part the projected answers have been very similar to the answers given by the group that is actually considering its own future behavior. However, when the last set of questions is asked of students who do expect to be at school at the Columbia Point campus and who are willing to live in student housing (about 40% of the student body), the preferences become even clearer.

Preferred location for student housing	
Columbia Pt.	63%
Dorchester	10%
South Boston	5%

Prefers:	
Apt. w. common facilities	32%
Apt. w. DR & common facilities	24%
Apartment	22%
Dormitory	19%

Prefers:	
University Management	24%
Student Co-op	61%
Semi-public	7%

Conclusions

Before summing up, it should be noted that the students do refer directly to Dorchester as the community to which they will move. However, we do not believe they are adequately familiar with either the neighborhoods or the transportation facilities at this time, and that certain other neighborhoods close to the Red Line in South Boston, Milton, Quincy and Wollaston will also be included in the impact area.

It is impossible at this time to be exact about this. First, the students' knowledge is too scant for them to give reliable information. And second, the nature of the supplementary transportation facilities that are initiated in conjunction with the opening of the campus will further modify both the impact and the impact area - that is, these transportation facilities will both allow some people to live at home (who would otherwise have moved closer to the campus), and they will bring these same areas closer to the campus so that some students who have to move will settle around the transportation facility, rather than directly adjacent to the campus.

The Student Survey indicates strongly that there will be a major housing impact from the opening of UMass Boston on Columbia Point. We will define housing impact to mean those students who will move into Dorchester and adjacent communities in order to be closer or more convenient to the campus. It will include both those students who would normally be living independently of their parents and who choose to locate in the impact area because they are attending UMass Boston, and also those students who would prefer to live at home, but feel they cannot commute adequately from their parents' homes and so move into the impact area.

Earlier in this chapter, a number of different trends were described which contributed to the housing impact. These trends cannot be added together, as they include many of the same students. For example, the student who is described as being part of the 13% who say they plan to live in Dorchester when the campus opens may also be included in the students who now walk to school, two-thirds of whom we assume will move into Dorchester. Or, he might also be one of the 22% of juniors and seniors whom we expect to move away from home at the age of 20 or 21. It is important that

all these trends be listed and understood, but it is critically important that the reader NOT ADD THEM UP.

There are three major trends indicating the nature and size of the housing impact:

- | | |
|--|--|
| <p>1) 7% of last year's students lived in Dorchester, but 13% of the students expect to live in Dorchester when attending school at Columbia Point, and an additional 4% intend to live close to the school. The increase is</p> | <p><u>DO NOT ADD</u>
<u>THESE</u>
<u>NUMBERS!</u></p> <p><u>Level of Increase</u></p> <p>10% or 500 stdnts</p> |
| <p>2) 22% of juniors and seniors will move away from home when they reach the age of 20 or 21, and a substantial and increasing proportion can be expected to move to Dorchester. This increase will be between . . .</p> | <p>0-22%, 0-1100 stdnts</p> |
| <p>3) There is an 8% drop in the number of juniors and seniors living at home as a consequence of the move. This increase is over and above that cited above in (2) . . .</p> | <p>8% or 400 stdnts</p> |

Another minor, but important trend is:

- | | |
|--|------------------------|
| <p>4) 12% of entering freshmen expected to live in Dorchester <u>this</u> year in contrast to the 7% of last year's students who lived there. This is an increase of . . .</p> | <p>5% or 70 stdnts</p> |
|--|------------------------|

Other trends worth noting that contribute to the housing impact are:

- | | |
|---|----------------------------|
| <p>5) 17% of the students share housing with other students and 80% of these live in Boston and Cambridge. As these students graduate and are replaced by others, an increasing proportion can be expected to move to Dorchester. This increase will be between</p> | <p>0-14%, 0-680 stdnts</p> |
|---|----------------------------|

- | | |
|---|--|
| | <u>DO NOT ADD</u>
<u>THESE</u>
<u>NUMBERS!</u> |
| | <u>Level of Increase</u> |
| 6) 12% of entering freshmen intend to live either alone or with students. Assuming that most of them will be looking for housing, the number that could settle in Dorchester is | 0-12%, 0-168 stdnts |
| 7) 9% of students now walk to school and pay the lowest rents. At least 2/3 of them can be expected to move to Dorchester in order to continue this lifestyle. The increase will be between | 0-9%, 0-450 stdnts |
| 8) There will be three times as many students living either alone or with students in Dorchester when the campus opens | 2.4%, 128 stdnts |

Please note that the trends described in 1, 4, and 8 are based on students who said they would be moving to Dorchester or living in Dorchester. The trends described in 2,3,5,6 and 7 are based on students who are going to move, and whom we expect in increasing numbers to move close to the Columbia Point campus, most likely in Dorchester.

We believe that, with no increase in enrollment, these effects will add 15-20% of the student body to that 6% now seeking housing in Dorchester in each of the next two years. With no increase in enrollment, this figure could be expected to rise to 25% of the student body as students become familiar with the area and a student community is established.

(15-20% = 750-1000)
(25% = 1250)

But these figures are inadequate because they are based on no increase in enrollment. In fact, current University plans call for a growth of 1500 students/year. And if there were no change in the distribution as to where the students come from, the first two years would see an additional increase of 225-300 students each year living in Dorchester, and a larger percentage later on.

	<u>Incremental</u> <u>Increase Resulting</u> <u>From Enrollment</u> <u>Expansion</u>
	15-20% = 225-300/yr
	25% = 375/yr

However, even these figures may be too small. The Admissions' Office reports that UMass Boston has almost reached the upper limit of eligible students in can hope to enroll from schools in Boston - 2000 Boston students. As UMass Boston's enrollment is expanded, more and more of its student body will have to come from the outlying suburbs, from central and western Massachusetts, and even from out of state. These students cannot live at home and go to school, even if they wanted to. They will have to seek housing within commuting distance.

Presently, 60% of the student body comes from outside of the city of Boston. If enrollment increases at the pace suggested in the Master Plan, 75% of the students will come from outside Boston in 1974, over 80% in 1976, and when the maximum proposed enrollment of 15,000 is reached, 87% will come from outside the city of Boston.

Year	Maximum Boston Enrollment	Total Student Body	% Boston	% Non-Boston
1972	2000	5000	40%	60%
1973	2000	6500	32	68
1974	2000	8000	25	75
1975	2000	9500	21	79
1976	2000	11,000	18	82
1977	2000	12,500	16	84
1978	2000	14,000	14	86
1979	2000	15,000	13	87

Because the data on home addresses is faulty as reported earlier, it is not possible to determine accurately from the data the increasing proportion of students moving into local housing in relation to the distance of their home from the campus. We are therefore making a conservative estimate that 60% of the increment will be seeking housing nearer the campus. This means that with each annual increase of 1500 students we will expect an additional 900 students annually to be looking for convenient housing.

Using these figures, we can derive the total housing impact for each year, until the University reaches its maximum proposed enrollment of 15,000.

Year	Total Enrollment	Effect of Moving Campus to Col.Pt.	Effect of Enrollment Increase	TOTAL HOUSING IMPACT
1972	5,000	300		300
1973	6,500	15% - 975	900	1,875
1974	8,000	20% - 1,600	900	2,500
1975	9,500	25% - 2,375	900	3,275
1976	11,000	25% - 2,750	900	3,650
1977	12,500	25% - 3,125	900	4,025
1978	14,000	25% - 3,500	900	4,400
1979	15,000	25% - 3,725	900	4,625

CHAPTER IV

THE STAFF AND FACULTY

When the University comes to Dorchester it is planning to bring not only 15,000 students, but 2,500 faculty and staff members. While the major impact on housing is expected to come from the students, it is likely that there will be some effect from these other groups. However, the housing needs of the faculty and staff are likely to be different than those of students. Students are more mobile and move often, and will look for apartments. Faculty and staff would be more likely to look for homes to buy.

The transportation system serving the University will also affect the faculty and staff. If traffic problems and lack of public transportation make commuting difficult, these groups are also likely to think about moving closer to the campus.

The Task Force wanted to assess the overall impact on housing by the faculty and staff that was likely. An attempt, parallel to the student survey, was made to determine the housing patterns of present UMass Boston faculty and staff and to base projections for the future on this data.

A number of questions were raised. Are there differences in the locational patterns of the faculty and other staff? Are the housing patterns of the UMass faculty the same or different from other Universities in the area? Do staff members plan to keep their jobs when the UMass campus moves to Columbia Point? Do they plan to move, to be closer to their jobs?

In order to make determinations of the present location patterns, the UMass Directory of Faculty and Staff 1971-1972 was used and a listing of the staff by job category and address was compiled. Out of 618 listings, 472 were classified as faculty and professional staff, and 146 were clerical and technical workers.

The differences in the patterns of the two groups are pronounced. Approximately 3/4 of each group lives in the areas comprising Boston and the core suburbs. But within that 3/4, the division is apparent. Over half of the clerical and technical staff (55%) live within the City of Boston itself, compared to only 28% of the faculty group; the areas within the City where these two groups live are also different. Only 7% of the faculty live in the neighborhoods, while 27.5% of the non-professional staff live in Brighton, Jamaica Plain, Roslindale, and Hyde Park. The following table shows the breakdown in detail.

RESIDENTIAL LOCATION OF UNIVERSITY PERSONNEL

	Fac/Admin.	Cler/Tech.
Central Boston*	21%	27.5%
Brighton	2%	3.5%
Dorchester	2%	13.0%
South Boston	0%	1.0%
Roxbury	1%	2.0%
Rest of Boston**	<u>2%</u>	<u>8.0%</u>
<u>Boston Total:</u>	28%	55.0%
Cambridge	18%	5.5%
Brookline	9%	3.0%
Newton	12%	1.0%
Belmont	0%	0.0%
Arlington	2%	1.0%
Remainder	<u>7%</u>	<u>11.6%</u>
<u>Total Core:</u>	76%	77.0%
<u>Inner Suburbs:</u>	11%	14.4%
<u>Outer Suburbs:</u>	<u>11%</u>	<u>7.0%</u>
<u>Greater Boston Area:</u>	98%	98.6%

* Central Boston includes Beacon Hill, Back Bay, Copley Square, and the South End.

** Rest of Boston includes Jamaica Plain, Hyde Park, Roslindale, West Roxbury, and East Boston.

Before the University moved to Dorchester 13% of the clerical and technical staff lived there, but only 2% of the faculty and administrative staff. Most of the professional staff who live in Boston live in the central areas, including Beacon Hill, Back Bay and the South End; these neighborhoods are particularly convenient to the Arlington Street Campus. Almost half (48%) of the faculty and administrators live in the inner suburbs of Newton, Cambridge, Brookline and Arlington, while only 22% of the non-professional staff live in those areas.

The residential patterns of the 472 faculty and professional staff were compared with the location of similar personnel at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The MIT survey, made up from a similar directory, had 1373 respondents; the general patterns are very similar for the two institutions. They compare as follows:

	UMass	M.I.T.
Boston	28%	11%
Cambridge	18%	23%
Brookline	9%	5%
Newton	12%	6%
Belmont	0%	5%
Arlington	2%	5%
Remainder of core	7%	7%
<u>Total Core*</u> :	76%	62%
Inner Suburbs**:	11%	18%
Outer Suburbs***:	<u>11%</u>	<u>19%</u>
<u>Greater Boston Area:</u>	98%	99%

* The "Core" includes Somerville, Watertown, Melrose, Malden, Medford, Revere, Everett & Chelsea, as well as suburbs listed above.

** The "Inner Suburbs" include Lexington, Wellseley, Waltham, Winchester, Framingham, Needham, Dedham, Saugus, Lynn, Milton, Quincy and a few others (see attached map).

*** The "Outer Suburbs" go as far north as Amesbury, west to Groton, Westboro & Attleboro; south to Taunton & Middleboro (see map).

It is apparent that the two institutions do not differ much in general residential pattern for faculty and administrative people. UMass, located in Boston, has 76% living within the Boston core; MIT in Cambridge, has 62% in the same area. The major difference, of course, is in the City of Boston where UMass has 28% to MIT's 11%. Excluding Boston, the percentages in the core suburbs are nearly the same - 48% for UMass to 51% for MIT. Both have sizeable populations in Cambridge, and MIT's population spreads out farther into the suburbs.

There was no comparable survey at MIT for non-professional support personnel. Information on clerical and technical workers at UMass was limited because most of those jobs are carried out under contract and the employees are not UMass Boston employees listed in the Directory. In order to supplement the sparse information on which to measure impact on housing from non-professional workers, a survey of 36 employees at UMass was taken. These employees were selected at random from the total population of approximately 200 clerical and technical listed employees at UMass, Boston. The determination of those eligible for sampling was based on the job title of the employee. A questionnaire written by the Survey Research Program was distributed to the selected employees (Appendix D). Among the questions were: How long have you worked for UMass? If the campus moves to Columbia Point, will you go with your job? How would you get there? Is there any possibility you might move closer?

Of the 36 sampled, only 24 respondents were found. The remaining 12 no longer worked for UMass, confirming what had already been reported, that there is a high level of turnover in these job areas. Fourteen of the twenty-four have worked for UMass for less than two years. Most of the jobs (22 out of 24) will be transferred to Columbia Point.

Of the 24 respondents, 6 lived in Central Boston, 5 in Dorchester, 5 in other neighborhoods close to Dorchester, and the remaining 8 in the suburbs.

Only 4 of the respondents said they would travel to their jobs at Columbia Point by public transportation. Eleven will commute by car. Thirteen of the respondents said that they would not move their residence, whether they keep the job or not.

Based on these data, it does not appear likely that there will be a severe impact on housing resources in Dorchester from faculty and staff at UMass Boston. The housing patterns of UMass faculty are not very different from other faculties in the Boston area. They tend to live in the suburban areas where general family requirements (land, schools, yard) are met. As UMass expands, more faculty will be hired; if, as UMass expects, their new faculty come from the schools in Boston area which are cutting back, their residential patterns are not likely to be very much different from those examined, and they will not be likely to move.

For staff workers the situation is somewhat different. Many non-professional staff already live in Dorchester or in nearby neighborhoods. Change in these patterns will be determined by UMass' contracting and hiring policies. If the University commits itself to hiring Dorchester people, there will be virtually no impact.

However, the question of impact depends on other considerations also. Accessibility to the University by either public transportation or by private car will be a major determinant in whether people stay where they are, or move. The Dorchester area has many attractions; if the staff is having difficulty getting to the University these attractions will serve as magnets, drawing more people into the competition for housing in Dorchester. Some of the neighborhoods of Dorchester are within walking distance of the University.

This advantage is likely to be most important. At the present time, transportation services to the University are poor to non-existent. The major roads to the University, the Expressway and Morrissey

Boulevard, are already operating beyond capacity at rush hours. the MBTA's Red Line stop at Columbia offers the best connection to the campus, if sufficient buses are made available, but at least for the first year these buses will have to cross six lanes of Morrissey Boulevard traffic. Parking on campus will be limited for both staff and students. Car-pools will be encouraged, but they are often inconvenient. If lack of convenient transportation continues, walking will become an attractive alternative.

The cost of housing in this area is much lower than in the suburbs or in other areas of the city. The median value of houses in the areas of Dorchester surrounding the University is about \$16,000, well within the means of a University professor or administrator. There are many homes which would be suitable for professional employees of the University. Elegant Victorian houses and Newport-style sprawling homes were built many years ago for the middle class in Dorchester. Also, these staff members are not going to experience difficulty in getting mortgages, although many present Dorchester residents claim that they can not get mortgages so that they can buy homes and stay in Dorchester.

From the traditional point of view of faculty and professional people, there are some disadvantages to living in Dorchester too. They do not consider the school system adequate, a major factor in faculty concentrations in suburbs with nationally-known school systems. And the level of City services in Dorchester is criticized. Trash collection, enforcement of traffic laws, street cleaning and snow removal are not carried out to the satisfaction of the present residents of Dorchester.

Some view the coming of the University to Dorchester as an opportunity for economic improvement for the area - that the neighborhoods will benefit from the income produced by the staff and students at the University, and that the problem is not how great the impact will be, but how to harness it.

The Task Force takes a different tack. The neighborhoods will no longer be their neighborhoods

Before the University moved to Dorchester 13% of the clerical and technical staff lived there, but only 2% of the faculty and administrative staff. Most of the professional staff who live in Boston live in the central areas, including Beacon Hill, Back Bay and the South End; these neighborhoods are particularly convenient to the Arlington Street Campus. Almost half (48%) of the faculty and administrators live in the inner suburbs of Newton, Cambridge, Brookline and Arlington, while only 22% of the non-professional staff live in those areas.

The residential patterns of the 472 faculty and professional staff were compared with the location of similar personnel at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. The MIT survey, made up from a similar directory, had 1373 respondents; the general patterns are very similar for the two institutions. They compare as follows:

	UMass	M.I.T.
Boston	28%	11%
Cambridge	18%	23%
Brookline	9%	5%
Newton	12%	6%
Belmont	0%	5%
Arlington	2%	5%
Remainder of core	<u>7%</u>	<u>7%</u>
<u>Total Core*</u> :	76%	62%
Inner Suburbs**:	11%	18%
Outer Suburbs***:	<u>11%</u>	<u>19%</u>
<u>Greater Boston Area:</u>	98%	99%

* The "Core" includes Somerville, Watertown, Melrose, Malden, Medford, Revere, Everett & Chelsea, as well as suburbs listed above.

** The "Inner Suburbs" include Lexington, Wellseley, Waltham, Winchester, Framingham, Needham, Dedham, Saugus, Lynn, Milton, Quincy and a few others (see attached map).

*** The "Outer Suburbs" go as far north as Amesbury, west to Groton, Westboro & Attleboro; south to Taunton & Middleboro (see map).

It is apparent that the two institutions do not differ much in general residential pattern for faculty and administrative people. UMass, located in Boston, has 76% living within the Boston core; MIT in Cambridge, has 62% in the same area. The major difference, of course, is in the City of Boston where UMass has 28% to MIT's 11%. Excluding Boston, the percentages in the core suburbs are nearly the same - 48% for UMass to 51% for MIT. Both have sizeable populations in Cambridge, and MIT's population spreads out farther into the suburbs.

There was no comparable survey at MIT for non-professional support personnel. Information on clerical and technical workers at UMass was limited because most of those jobs are carried out under contract and the employees are not UMass Boston employees listed in the Directory. In order to supplement the sparse information on which to measure impact on housing from non-professional workers, a survey of 36 employees at UMass was taken. These employees were selected at random from the total population of approximately 200 clerical and technical listed employees at UMass, Boston. The determination of those eligible for sampling was based on the job title of the employee. A questionnaire written by the Survey Research Program was distributed to the selected employees (Appendix D). Among the questions were: How long have you worked for UMass? If the campus moves to Columbia Point, will you go with your job? How would you get there? Is there any possibility you might move closer?

Of the 36 sampled, only 24 respondents were found. The remaining 12 no longer worked for UMass, confirming what had already been reported, that there is a high level of turnover in these job areas. Fourteen of the twenty-four have worked for UMass for less than two years. Most of the jobs (22 out of 24) will be transferred to Columbia Point.

Of the 24 respondents, 6 lived in Central Boston, 5 in Dorchester, 5 in other neighborhoods close to Dorchester, and the remaining 8 in the suburbs.

if the goal of economic improvement prevails. Most of the residents are not able to compete economically with either students or staff; neighborhood improvement really means resident displacement. The means available to control the influx are extremely limited. If accessibility is not improved, the impact on Dorchester will be overwhelming and the conclusions from the surveys of preference for location for faculty and staff will be overturned.

CHAPTER V

TRANSPORTATION

After six months of investigating the problem of transporting 15,000 students to and from the University of Massachusetts campus at Columbia Point, the suspicion lingers that no satisfactory solution can be reached.

The Commonwealth repeatedly refused to allocate capital funds to link the University's Boston campus to the MBTA station one mile away. The Trustees of the University cling to the General Court's original conception that the campus shall be commuter oriented. The City, the MDC and the State DPW are only able to conceptualize and implement short-range street and signalization improvements. And the MBTA is considering consultant recommendations that perceive shuttle busses between the Red Line's Columbia Station and the campus as a temporary solution, and an automated People Mover between the same points, as the permanent solution.

The Task Force believes that the buses will not work well, that the Red Line will be overloaded with several thousand additional riders daily, and that the People Mover will never be funded. If this happens, the inadequate bus system will become, by default, the permanent solution. And the Dorchester-Columbia Point community will find itself jeopardized, as a result of the development of a University campus at Columbia Point, by a transportation, as well as a housing, crisis.

Transportation was not included in the Task Force's work program. However, quite early in the study it became apparent that the housing impact of the UMass Boston development was related directly to the lack of transportation facilities for the thousands of students, faculty, and staff expected to attend and use the University. If commuting to

Columbia Point is simple and quick, people living within a reasonable distance could be expected to remain living in their homes. But if commuting is lengthy and difficult, many more people could be expected to try and settle closer to the campus. The Task Force, therefore, decided to investigate what was being done to resolve the approaching transportation crisis, and to define a constructive role for the Dorchester-Columbia Point community in forcing solutions to that crisis.

A commuter campus in a large urban area such as Boston obviously requires some form of public mass transit. But none now exists to the Columbia Point site. Only one of the MBTA's major transit lines - the Ashmont Line - has a station within one mile of the Campus at Columbia Road. A second, the Quincy Line, passes under Columbia Road but has no station. One bus route, No. 8, runs through the Columbia Point housing development adjacent to the campus. It takes no imagination to understand that a large-scale investment in public transportation is needed to link the University campus with the city it is to serve.

The University itself was aware of this need at the time it accepted Columbia Point as the site for its Boston campus. In the course of investigating all potential permanent sites, the University carried out a transit accessibility analysis. Assuming a value of 100 for a campus location in downtown Boston, where most of the major MBTA transit lines intersect, the analysis gave the temporary UMass campus at 100 Arlington Street an accessibility index value of 65. The Columbia Point site, if served by bus, was given an index value of around 35. The University's analysis concluded that, by transit, the Columbia Point site was approximately twice as hard to get to (for the average commuting student) as Arlington Street.

In spite of this unfavorable accessibility analysis, the University accepted the Columbia Point site for its Boston campus. In doing so, the

University assumed it would be possible to improve the site's accessibility through the introduction of an automated People Mover between the MBTA's Columbia Road station and the campus. Technologically this was possible. Politically, it was not.

In the first budget submitted by the University, after the decision to move to Columbia Point was taken, the University included a request for \$9 million to study, design, and construct this transportation facility. This request never reached the legislature. It was stricken from the budget in the Governor's office where the University was told that transportation was not its business - it should stick to education, where it had quite enough problems.

The following year, the University included a request for \$2 million to develop transportation plans and designs. Construction money was not requested. This too was rejected on the same grounds. The third year, the University submitted its request to do transportation planning in a separate piece of legislation, not included in the budget which had to go through the Governor's office before it could reach the legislature. However, the legislature responded in the same way as the Governor's budget office had in the past - the University should stay out of the transportation business. Defeated, the University, in 1972, turned to the MBTA for help.

Responding to the needs of the University, the MBTA entered into a contract in May, 1972, with Vollmer Associates to study the feasibility of "People Movers and alternate transit modes to the new campus of the University of Massachusetts." Designing for a peak rate of 7,100 university passengers an hour when the campus reaches maximum enrollment of 15,000, plus approximately 1,000 passengers a day to and from the Columbia Point housing development, Vollmer Associates evaluated five separate ways of providing transit service and capacity between Columbia Road and the University - buses, light rail, rapid transit, rapid transit connecting directly to the MBTA system, and People Movers.

In a report soon to be released by the MBTA, Vollmer recommends the use of buses as an interim solution only (a summary of the Vollmer Report will be found in Appendix F). To become operational by September, 1973, Vollmer proposes routing buses to the campus along Morrissey Boulevard via an on-grade signalized intersection at the University's access road. Terminal improvements at the Columbia Road station also are recommended.

Vollmer's permanent solution - to be operational by the fall of 1976 (if a decision to proceed is made immediately) - is the construction of a People Mover on an exclusive right-of-way, separate from the existing surface street system, along the northerly property line of the Boston College High School. Vollmer estimates the total project will cost (at 1972 prices) \$11 million. Annual operational costs (a fully-automated system with no on-board attendants) are estimated to be \$300,000. An intermediate station is included to provide service to the Columbia Point housing development, the Boston College High School, and other institutions.

In effect, the Vollmer report up-dates earlier assumptions and knowledge. Buses will have to be used when the University opens, and, hopefully a People Mover can be introduced before it is too late. Vollmer's figures, however, document the danger of using buses for more than a few years. If and when the University reaches an enrollment of 15,000, Vollmer calculates 22 to 25 new 75-passenger buses, operating on a 37-second headway, will be required. Capital costs will be \$4 million, and operating costs will be \$800,000 a year at today's costs. Vollmer concludes with the words, "a bus solution is not desirable in the long range."

However, more than mass transit improvements are required. Located on a peninsula jutting into the Dorchester Bay, and isolated from the remainder of Dorchester and Boston by Morrissey Boulevard and the Southeast Expressway, the University's Columbia Point campus site requires many transportation solutions not related to mass transit. Literally,

hundreds of small and large-scale local and regional street improvements must be made. To mention but a few: a signalized interchange and underpass is needed at the Morrissey Boulevard access to the campus; the Freeport Street and Morrissey Boulevard intersection requires signal upgrading and channelization; Kosciuszko Circle must be enlarged; Pulaski Circle and Mt. Vernon Street must be replaced; the Columbia Road bridge needs to be widened and reconstructed; Columbia Road at Exit 17 of the Southeast Expressway requires signalization and channelization; the Dorchester Bay Bridge must be replaced; and the Patten's Cove culvert has to be reconstructed. Even without UMass, there are serious traffic problems ahead.

Parking and its related policies are other issues that must be resolved if the Columbia Point housing development and the Dorchester neighborhoods are not to be engulfed by University-oriented automobiles. Unfortunately, little attention has been given to these issues to date.

The only information available to the Task Force is on the amount of parking to be built by the University at the Columbia Point campus, and even this information may not be firm. According to the University's out-dated Master Plan, in 1972 alone 2067 spaces are to be provided. By 1980 a total of six-thousand parking spaces are proposed for construction. The need for these parking spaces has been justified with the argument that the UMass Boston facility is not meant to be just for Boston students, that it is supposed to be a commuter school for Eastern Massachusetts, and that students from outside the commuter transportation network will of course commute by car.

This contradicts the entire transportation policy of the State, as announced by the Governor of the Commonwealth at the conclusion of the Boston Transportation Planning Review, which is to encourage cars to stop at the perimeter of the metropolitan area, park in large parking facilities, and to have their drivers enter the MBTA and proceed

from the perimeter by transit. Commuters to UMass Boston at Columbia Point should be considered as part of this commuting public, and the parking facilities to the University restricted accordingly.

The implications of 6,000 parking spaces are frightening for the Dorchester-Columbia Point communities. Parking spaces generate cars. And cars generate congestion. There is serious question of the ability of the local Dorchester and Columbia Point street system, even improved as planned, to handle the cars that will be attracted to these parking spaces. Transportation technicians in the City's Traffic Department fear the local streets may be able to absorb only the first year's construction program of 2,000 parking spaces.

Whether and what price the University will charge for the use of this parking, the hours this parking will be made available for use, and how the City's on-street parking regulations will be enforced in the Columbia Point and Dorchester residential neighborhoods - none of these have been determined.

Difficult as it will be to achieve the operation of an interim bus system, the funding of a People Mover, the improvement of the local streets, and the control of parking, the more difficult task will be the coordination of all these elements into a cohesive transportation strategy and construction program. The enlarging of Kosciuszko Circle must be meshed with the opening of University parking; the interim bus system must be coordinated with the reconstruction of the Columbia Road bridge; the enforcement of on-street parking regulations must be tied in to the construction of the Morrissey Boulevard underpass; and the campaign to obtain funds for the People Mover must be coordinated with the funding of street improvements. Just about every public and private group imaginable - the federal, state, regional and city agencies; the University; the business community; the neighborhood organizations - will have to begin to work together if the Dorchester and Columbia Point communities are to have even a chance at avoiding the impending transportation chaos.

Recognizing the problem, Secretary of Transportation and Construction, Alan Altshuler, has organized a committee to study and coordinate all the current and future plans for resolving the impact of the Columbia Point campus on traffic and parking. Mr. Altshuler has promised that the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force will have a responsible role in this coordinating committee and, to that end, he has indicated that funds would be made available to the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force for the employment of its own technical assistance (correspondence with Secretary Altshuler will be found in Appendix E). The study and coordination effort organized on a crash eight-month time schedule, is expected to start early January, 1973.

Recommendations

1. To make certain that an inadequate interim bus shuttle system between the Columbia Road MBTA station and the Columbia Point campus does not become, by default, the permanent system. It should be determined before the University of Massachusetts opens its Columbia Point campus that either (a) the buses will give adequate service to the campus, or (b) the buses will be replaced by a People Mover or its equivalent. Furthermore, no future expansion should take place until the transportation system has proven to be adequate for the increased number of students.
2. To insure that there will be an interim bus shuttle system between the Columbia Road MBTA station and the Columbia Point campus, the University of Massachusetts and the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force should vigorously support the MBTA in its 1973 request for capital and operating funds for this area.
3. To increase the ability of students and staff to reach Columbia Point from other parts of the city, the MBTA should experiment, during the first year of the University's operation, with express bus service from a number of convenient transfer points such as Forest Hills, Kenmore Square, Route 128, and Quincy Center.

4. In conjunction with the Governor's office, the legislature, Secretary Altshuler's office, the MBTA and the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force, the University of Massachusetts should resume its campaign to obtain funding for a long range solution.
5. To discourage the use of private automobiles for commuting to the Columbia Point campus, the University of Massachusetts should: (a) drastically reduce the number of on-campus parking spaces it plans to construct; and/or (b) adopt a pricing policy for the use of this parking, in excess of the cost of public transportation; and/or (c) encourage the use of car pools as a means of reducing the number of cars coming to the community; and/or (d) encourage the City to rigorously enforce on-street parking regulations in the residential areas of Columbia Point and Dorchester and, if need be, strengthen these regulations.
6. To ensure the participation of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force in all the transportation activities that relate to the opening of the Columbia Point campus, Secretary Altshuler should implement his promise to make funds available for technical assistance to the community.

CHAPTER VI

UNIVERSITY POLICIES

Just as the housing problems created by the coming of the University to Dorchester are related to City and State transportation policies, so the housing impact is also related to the University's policies for admission and enrollment, and also for employment. And just as the Task Force had no plans initially to deal with transportation problems, but found itself forced to do so, similarly, the Task Force found it was obliged to take a position on matters of educational policy in a way it had not anticipated. That involvement took its most public form when a representative of the Task Force testified before a public hearing held by the Boston City Council's Subcommittee on the University of Massachusetts at Boston. The Task Force's testimony will be found in Appendix G.

Admissions and Enrollment.

The impact of the University on housing in Dorchester will be determined to a great extent by how many people are coming to the University as students, faculty and staff; where they now live, how convenient it is for them to get to the University from where they live now, and how much they can afford to spend on commuting, or housing or both.

Naturally, the fewer people coming into the area, the smaller the likely impact. However, it is even possible to expect large numbers of students without a massive housing impact if they come from places close enough and convenient enough for them to commute efficiently and economically.

In January 1971, the Admissions Committee of UMass Boston reaffirmed their concern for the Boston student and their desire to maintain the proportion of Boston students at forty percent. In September 1972, with a student population of 5488, UMass Boston had 2096 students from Boston representing about 38 percent of the total enrollment of the Boston campus. Admissions personnel indicate that they do not think they can enroll more students from Boston schools than this.

About eight thousand students graduate from Boston high schools, public and private, each year. About half of these, or four thousand, are in college preparatory courses. Out of all the college-bound high school graduates from Boston, UMass enrolls five to six hundred per year. This figure is expected to remain steady.

The admissions policy set in 1965 is that any Massachusetts high school graduate with a combined SAT score of around 800 is eligible for admission. In the beginning, the growth goals were hard to fill. Last year for the first time, the number of applicants exceeded greatly the number of places in the freshman class. The students admitted had higher SAT scores and placed higher in their high school classes. Also there were more applicants and enrollees from the outer and more affluent suburbs. Given the 1965 admission policy, these suburban students, coming from well-to-do families and communities with excellent high school preparatory courses, had a decided advantage in getting admitted to UMass Boston. And with college costs spiralling, UMass is an attractive choice for these students.

As the University population expands and the number of Boston students remains steady, it is inevitable that the present proportion of students from Boston will drop sharply under current Admissions policy. If the University in Boston is to be a real educational resource for the Boston resident, it is clear that expansion must be limited and admissions policies changed.

The University is presently planning for a total enrollment of 15,000 at the Columbia Point campus by the year 1980. This goal was set in 1967 by the Board of Higher Education. They projected that the public sector would have to provide an additional 118,000 new places for higher education of Massachusetts residents by 1980, and that UMass Boston's share of that would be 15,000.

However, the projections were calculated on a birth rate higher than actually occurred and on

the rate of college applications that were being filed at that time. In the meantime the number of high school graduates applying to college has dropped off.

The projections for 15,000 students includes only full-time day students and not all those who will be enrolled in continuing education, night courses and part-time. If these students were included the total would be well over 20,000.

Concern arises over these figures when the admissions personnel report that they do not think that they can get more than the 500-600 students per year from Boston that are now enrolling. However, the Task Force believes that it is possible for the University to accept more students from Boston by changing its admissions policies and that the proportion of students from Boston can be maintained through a combination of a change in policy and limiting the total enrollment.

The total enrollment at the Columbia Point campus should not exceed 10,000, or that proposed for Phase II.

Access to the campus is limited, and it is difficult to imagine that 15,000 students will ever be able to be accommodated. Limiting enrollment will mean diminishing the number of possible competitors for housing nearby in Dorchester, and will mean that the University will be able to make land available for student housing which is now earmarked for academic uses. It will also reflect more accurately the number of places that the school need provide to meet actual demand, rather than the inflated demand predicted by the Board of Higher Education.

In order to maintain at least a 50% Boston enrollment out of the 10,000 total student population, the University should offer a policy of open enrollment to students from Boston.

Under an open enrollment policy, any resident of the City of Boston who has a high school diploma or its equivalent is eligible for admission, without having to pass examinations with a minimum grade. Such a

policy would encourage present high school students and other residents, long out of school, to enroll at UMass Boston and to take advantage of the educational opportunity offered to them. Many Boston parents did not in the past encourage their children to attend college because it seemed impossible financially. Now, Dorchester parents with a college at their doorstep want to make sure this resource is available to their children. This is also the feeling of Bostonians who are working now but would like to upgrade themselves through college attendance. It is important that Boston residents who would otherwise be unable to attend college have the opportunity to attend a college they can afford and that they continue to constitute the majority of the student body at UMass Boston.

However, a decision to open its enrollment to any resident of the City of Boston who has completed high school will impose a responsibility on the University to supplement the preparation of those applying so that they can carry out college work. Many students now attending Boston schools have been discouraged from pursuing college preparatory courses. Since UMass provides them with an economically feasible possibility for college, they will need academic preparation.

The University should in no way lower its academic standards in order to accommodate students with inadequate preparation. Instead they should institute a thirteenth year program through which a student can make up what he or she missed in high school.

The thirteenth year would be a transitional year between high school and college and would consist of classes and tutorial work which would enable a student to enter the regular college program the following year, competent to carry out his work. A thirteenth year program is different from the Special Students Program now in effect at UMass. By completing the support work he needs in one year, a student from the thirteenth year is no different from any other student when he begins his freshman year. In the special programs, students are singled out as needing special help and attention, and they remain in a disadvantaged category.

The transitional program should only be a temporary solution, however. If the school systems are providing adequate preparation for college for their students, it will not matter whether they go to college directly after high school, or wait a few years. Either way they should have no difficulty in carrying out degree program work.

Adequate preparation means not only offering the courses that are necessary for college, but also the guidance, support and encouragement for students so that they will know the alternatives available to them.

Many high schools in Boston send only a few of their graduates on to college.

The University should work with these schools to encourage greater numbers of their students to attend UMass Boston through advising them of the programs available at the University, and informing them of the general prerequisites which the high school should provide.

The University should also work with the School Department to orient the Department's policy-making process to support the interests of college bound students.

Jobs

Another important part of the University's responsibility in helping the community is in its function as an employer. One of the most direct ways that people in the community have to resist pressures in the housing market is their ability to compete more effectively. That ability is a simple issue of income; many of the families who are most likely to be displaced in favor of students cannot pay competitive rents because they are unemployed or underemployed. Many families, owners as well as renters, may be able to resist pressure on them to move - if they have access to better jobs, or to part-time work for members of the family to supplement limited income. Obviously,

the University cannot hire all of the Columbia Point and Dorchester residents who need better jobs and higher incomes. But a substantial amount of new employment will be provided on campus, and there is no reason that the highest priority in hiring should not be given to local residents.

The University should negotiate with the Task Force a statement of understanding analogous to an affirmative action plan which will state specific numerical goals for Dorchester and Columbia Point residents to be employed in different job categories.

The University's Columbia Point campus is expected to have one thousand non-academic positions at maximum enrollment.

The University is a valuable source of employment because of the range of jobs it can offer. Maintenance, security, clerical, administrative, personnel services and academic positions will all need to be filled.

Unemployment is very high among Columbia Point residents and quite high in the Dorchester community.

The University must make a firm commitment to hire people from Columbia Point and Dorchester for these jobs and begin to institute the support services within its personnel operations that will insure that the commitment can be carried out. The first step must be to extend its recruitment from the limited advertising approach now used.

A branch personnel office should be established in the Dorchester and Columbia Point Field offices and direct recruitment for job openings carried out there.

Recruitment should be incorporated into the general program of community organization. Local residents should be able to apply for a job, be interviewed and hired within the environment they know, and not be sent to unfamiliar surroundings where the likelihood of success is diminished. A decentralized personnel

operation would also establish more personal links with new employees and begin to work on their adjustment problems, which so often impair their performance on the job and their job satisfaction.

The next step would be to institute training programs, which both prepare people for a specific job they will be placed in, and also provide them with basic skills which will enable residents to look forward to real job mobility.

Training must be linked to job placement and take place just before placement. Providing training that will not be put to use will only increase frustration and contribute to the problems already existing. The scope and extent of these training programs should be included in the negotiations for the Statement of Understanding.

The University will not be employing all its employees directly. It is expected that services such as cleaning and food service, which are contracted now, will continue to be contracted. However, it is possible for the University to separate certain discrete smaller operations from the larger overall contracts.

Small local contractors must be provided special opportunities to bid on contract set-asides so that they can compete at their own level for a share in the University's business, and can thrive and possibly expand as their experience and capacity increased.

The amount of these set-asides will depend on the bidding capacity of the local contractors, and the regulation of these amounts will also be included in the negotiations above.

The University, although a state institution, is not subject to civil service selection of employees but is limited to civil service pay scales. Salaries are not competitive with the private sector, and turnover at the lower end of the pay scale is high. However, the University is a growing institution and in that sense offers opportunity to those who can secure jobs and advance themselves.

In addition to jobs, the University should whenever possible do its business with local firms including print shops, office equipment, stationers and other small suppliers and service operations.

The Task Force recognizes the dilemma facing the University because of budget cutbacks. Requests for support personnel by the University to the legislature have been cut back repeatedly. The legislature continues to put the University in an untenable position by setting up departments and facilities and then refusing to appropriate sufficient funds to hire staff.

The community has a mutual interest with the University in securing the support personnel needed by the University to carry out its educational mandate in a satisfactory manner and will support the University's efforts to secure an adequate budget.

Only with sufficient faculty and staff can the University offer the community not only job opportunities, but also educational advantages for their children which, because of excessive cost of private schools, were not open to them previously.

Board of Trustees.

Many of the policies of the University of Massachusetts at Boston which affect the lives of the people in the neighborhood of the new campus were made by the Board of Trustees of the University. Some of these members are familiar with the area of Dorchester, but many are not. Some are sympathetic to considerations of the impact of a new public facility on its surroundings, others refuse to see any but the the positive effects. Since the University has become a physical reality in Dorchester, and its effects are already being felt on the housing market, it is important that the community have a voice on the decision making board of the University.

The University should make a place available on its Board of Trustees to a member of the community of Dorchester, selected by the community.

It might be appropriate to appoint this person Chairman of the new Subcommittee of the Board which has met with the Task Force. In any case, it is important to widen the representation on the Board of the University so that in its policy-making role it can be aware of the wider implications of its decisions.

CHAPTER VII

SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF COLUMBIA POINT

To the outsider, the solution to many of the problems discussed in the preceding chapters seems obvious. There are housing resources adjacent to the University, the Columbia Point housing development. Move out the public housing tenants, fix the place up a little, and move in the students. Presto! All problems solved.

The Task Force rejects this solution. The tenants of the Columbia Point housing development have the same rights to their homes as the homeowners and tenants of private housing in the rest of Dorchester. It is not possible, either politically or financially, to create in the immediate future housing resources for 1100 families at public housing rent levels. Until such housing resources are available, and the tenants of Columbia Point approve and support the move to other housing, the Task Force will oppose any attempt to utilize the housing development for students.

The problems faced by tenants of public housing are acute all over the country. In recent years the program has been so critically underfunded that even the most socially stable projects have had difficulty keeping up with maintenance and adequate service. Projects like Columbia Point, which because of isolation or other special problems were the least sought after places for even the poorest tenants, eventually came to house the lion's share of the problem tenants of the public housing system.

In this chapter, the particular problems that the opening of the University's Columbia Point campus has brought to the residents of its neighbors in the housing project will be discussed.

1. History of the development of Columbia Point and earlier attempts to improve it.

The Columbia Point housing project stood for almost twenty years alone on a peninsula jutting

out into Boston Harbor. The residents watched and listened as proposal after proposal to use the remainder of the peninsula was raised, debated and rejected. Despite its natural advantages, the site, a former dump and prisoner of war camp, was never considered desirable. When the housing project was built in 1954, it immediately became a place apart from the neighborhoods surrounding it.

It is questionable whether the housing at Columbia Point was ever adequate. This monolithic development for low income families was the last of its kind built in Boston. Tenants moved into the new development despite its isolation and the social stigma associated with a Columbia Point address because there was no other housing they could afford. Columbia Point has never been viewed by its residents as anything but a waystation. People moved in out of necessity and left as soon as they were able to. For years the project and its people were ignored. There were no services, no schools, no shopping nearby.

Things began to change with the coming of the anti-poverty program. In the mid-sixties, the problems of poor, multi-problem families were the subject of comprehensive federal programs. Agencies responsible for the delivery of social services recognized the overwhelming need for services at Columbia Point.

In 1965 tenants organized a Community Action Agency Office at Columbia Point. Creating a community action organization meant organizing the tenants to create a 'representative' body which would act on behalf of all the tenants and represent their needs. It involved an intensive and successful effort to bring the project's tenants directly into the planning and execution of programs which would be introduced under the anti-poverty program umbrella. The result was creation of the Columbia Point Community Development Council which included representatives of all the active groups within the Columbia Point development.

In 1966, the first neighborhood health center in the country was opened at Columbia Point under the sponsorship of Tufts University. Again great effort

was taken to include the residents in the planning and overseeing of the activities of the Health Center, by the formation of a resident advisory board.

In 1967 the public housing Modernization Program was introduced. The aim of the Modernization Program was to involve tenants in plans for physical improvements of building, playground equipment, recreation and community facilities and safety and security measures. Modernization was to provide for renovation and remodeling of the project, not deferred maintenance. A renewed effort at community organization was made to put together a tenant Task Force which would guide the Modernization process. However, much of the representation came from those tenants already active on the Council.

The Modernization Program has been a disappointing and frustrating experience for Columbia Point. Enormous effort was expended on community planning but have been severely limited by the stingy funding of the program and have failed to approach the expectation raised by the program's title. The tenants were led to believe that this program was different and that, distinct from all the previous promises, would bring about the changes they needed. It was a false hope.

However, one so far successful product of the modernization effort was the design of an entire building. Tenants chose an architect, and produced a design which embodied their best ideas of a constructive public housing environment. The execution of this design would provide a real model for making public housing an attractive place to live. But true to bureaucratic form, this proposal is now enmeshed in complications, and there is real doubt that it will ever reach fruition.

2. Response to the decision to locate the University at Columbia Point.

Columbia Point was not without problems before the decision to locate the University of Massachusetts there was made. The coming of the campus was viewed by the residents of the housing project as a mixed blessing. On one hand, there would be advantages

such as additional job opportunities. Upon full enrollment in 1980 the University expects to have a staff of thirteen hundred including maintenance, clerical, administrative and research and technical assistants. Certainly some of these positions would be made available to their nearest neighbors.

Also this multi-million dollar institution would include facilities such as libraries, physical education areas, and laboratories for which the community could negotiate access. And educational opportunities, ranging from tutorial help for their children to continuing education courses for the adults was anticipated.

There was also a possibility that the prestige and recognition that would be accorded to the University at Columbia Point might help to break down the isolation and stigma that has existed up until now.

However, the situation was likely to bring disadvantages too. How would the traffic to and from the University be handled? What kinds of community conflict would be aroused by the two distinct populations? Was there a possibility that the project would be taken over for the University and the tenants left homeless? Would the coming of the University improve things for the tenants or make them even worse?

But the existing problems for public housing tenants at the time the decision was made to locate the University at Columbia Point have become incredibly more severe because of the Federal government's financial neglect of the projects.

In 1969 an amendment by Senator Brooke to federal housing assistance programs was passed by Congress limiting the rent paid by public housing tenants to no more than twenty-five percent of their income. Since rents provide the operating monies for local authorities, this amendment meant that the operating revenues would be drastically decreased since many tenants were paying as much as 50-60% of their income for rent at a time when maintenance and materials costs were rising. In order to make up this deficit, the

1969 and 1970 Housing Acts authorized HUD to give housing authorities adequate funds to cover the loss of income. Congress appropriated funds to carry out the law and cover the operating expenses of the Housing Authorities, but the White House has refused to release the money.

In an effort to dramatize the intolerable situation in public housing, tenants in Boston brought suit against the federal government over a year ago alleging that it was the duty of the Secretary of HUD under the United States Housing Act of 1937 to bring public housing projects into compliance with sanitary standards. But the court ruled that the secretary's only responsibility under the statute was to assist local housing authorities in providing housing. "Since, by statute, the federal defendants are limited to providing aid to local authorities, they cannot be sued for failure to provide the desired housing."

Local Housing Authorities are now caught in a struggle between the legislative and executive branches of the federal government. The loss in revenue to Columbia Point amounts to about \$150,000 per year. Losses like this multiplied by the number of developments in a city are causing Local Authorities to claim bankruptcy. St. Louis has already done so and Chicago and Boston threaten to do likewise.

At this time, however, it is clear that the aid which can help to bring about desirable housing is not available yet and there is little hope that it will be. The University's entry into this troubled situation has sharpened the fears and uncertainties of the present tenants of Columbia Point. The tenants fear that the financial predicament of the Housing Authority would force them to sell out to the University for housing students. A poignant indication of the level of anxiety on the part of the tenants is the fact that some elderly residents were refusing to allow workers to carry out Modernization work, putting in new plumbing. These tenants believed the work was being done to get ready for students. Enduring disruption of their apartments would not be worth it if in a few months time the renovation would benefit students.

In an effort to allay tenants' fears, the Task Force and the Development Council asked the Housing Authority to make a public statement confirming its commitment to the present low income residents. This was done immediately, but the fears have not been allayed and rumors of displacement continue.

Recognizing the difficulties of the situation at Columbia Point and their potential damaging effect on the functioning of the campus, the University has made attempts to establish relationships with the community. A first step was to open a field office. Construction had just begun, the reality of the University was imprinted on the consciousness of the residents and some formal channel of communication needed to be established. The Field Office was staffed with a Director, a community relations officer and an assistant. The Columbia Point Community Development Council designated a committee to work with the representatives of the University and to report back to the Council. The committee was made up of residents and representatives of agencies at Columbia Point. The role of the Columbia Point-UMass Coordinating Committee was to deal with all aspects of community-University relationships.

Neither the University nor any other agency offered the resources to start a new organizing campaign to involve tenants who have moved to Columbia Point within the past few years in the new activities. Consequently, Coordinating Committee members were delegates from other organizations and were already overcommitted with community work. Furthermore, there was no newsletter or paper to keep tenants informed of the activities of the committee or of the University, even in such important areas as job opportunities.

Despite these handicaps, the Coordinating Committee has attempted to work with the University and with the Task Force in pursuing the community's goals. The Committee's scope is broader than that of the Task Force and thus more issues were written into the consultant's scope of services for Columbia Point than for the rest of Dorchester. The Committee is concerned with housing conditions, and the effects on housing of transportation and UMass enrollment policies. They have also

been negotiating with the University for shared services and facilities, special job training, and the use of the Library and Physical Education facilities.

In order to make this Committee's work more effective, and to ensure that the interests of new residents of the development are stimulated and represented, a massive new effort at community organization must be funded. This is probably an area where the University can prove most valuable - in raising funds for this effort and providing some of the personnel.

3. Effect of UMass Boston on Housing at Columbia Point

Of the 1504 apartments at Columbia Point, 1411 are available for occupancy by low income tenants. 93 are used by the Housing Authority and social service agencies. At the present time 322 of these units are vacant and are unlikely to be filled. Approximately 80 of them are 1 bedroom apartments and 120 are 2 bedroom apartments. Because of increasing security problems elderly applicants who are eligible for occupancy refuse to accept these apartments and there are relatively few other applicants for small units. Overuse of facilities, vandalism, high vacancy and turnover rates are superimposed on the difficulties of high density and overcrowding. The spiral of increasing vacancies accompanied by increasing opportunity for vandalism appears to make the problem insoluble. No one wants to live in such intolerable conditions and the conditions are unlikely to improve unless those apartments can be filled. The deterioration of the physical plant contributes to the instability of the community. Columbia Point has a turnover rate of 21%.

Any attempt to break into the spiral of deterioration at Columbia Point must be preceded by the expenditure of large amounts of money to restore the buildings and the surroundings to habitable conditions. Major improvements must be made to elevators, incinerators, painting, waterproofing and security. Estimated cost of this work is about five million dollars. A Modernization budget of \$1,500,000 was allocated for improvements; 1368 bathrooms throughout the

development were renovated. Given present conditions, tenants have no motivation for sustained action to maintain the project adequately.

Simultaneous with physical restoration, the re-organizing of the residents of the project must take place. Without such an organizing effort, the physical improvements cannot be protected. While community organization is never an easy task, and those who need it most are hardest to organize, the task of organizing at Columbia Point is made even more difficult by the heavy turnover of tenants. And it has been made even harder by the empty promises of early programs which didn't work out. A new community organization effort would be essentially a total re-organization of all the tenants, since tenants who have moved in recently, to Columbia Point are not incorporated into any decision-making apparatus, and neither are older tenants represented any longer.

As bleak as the possibilities seem for changes which require funding, the community must take advantage of the attention focussed on their housing predicament by the opening of the University. In order to do this the tenants must be mobilized to act, to bring pressures on the University, the BHA, the City, the State and HUD. They must be able to determine priorities, make decisions and oversee implementation of the desired changes.

Given a commitment of funds to improve the project, a tenant organization could turn its attention to the alternatives open to them for maintaining their housing and providing a more secure environment. Without the cooperation of the tenants, security problems will not be overcome.

Columbia Point tenants have considered various alternatives for managing the project before. They were offered the opportunity to institute a Tenant Management Corporation under the OEO grant some years ago, but refused on grounds that still apply today. The tenants are not interested in assuming the responsibility for an impossible situation. However, if those conditions changed the tenants would be more inclined to review the alternatives: tenant management, a leasing

cooperative, as described by the proposal from Roger Willcox (included in Appendix I of this report), some form of private management, or to continue with BHA management.

None of the above considerations wrestle with the question of students moving into Columbia Point. Should students be admitted? If so, should they be clustered in one or two buildings, or dispersed throughout the twenty-seven buildings? Should there be a limit to the number of students to be admitted? Is there any likelihood that students will seek housing at Columbia Point?

Under present administrative policies, married students who fall within the income limits for public housing are eligible to be housed at Columbia Point. The one- and two-bedroom vacant units are suitable for married students and their small families. Out of the approximately 800 married students presently enrolled at UMass Boston, about 500 fall within the BHA revised income limits. (See Appendix J). In its present condition Columbia Point is not considered an attractive housing alternative by most of the students, who stress environmental concerns in their response to the Survey, but it would be if it were substantially improved. The student budgets would be eased by paying public housing rents.

Reaction to the possibility of a few hundred student families moving into the Columbia Point development is mixed. There is general agreement that groups of unrelated students should not be eligible. Some tenants are fearful that the arrival of even a few hundred student families who are eligible in every way would be the opening wedge and would, in the long run, mean total displacement and a reduction of the stock of apartments available for families in the lowest income categories.

However, most tenants feel that married students could only have a positive effect. The students might provide role models for the children, could engage in community services, and might become active participants in the organization and activities of the community. Furthermore, this kind of student residency

is seen as the possible lever for obtaining the funding needed to make the place habitable again for students and present tenants alike.

Efforts were made in the course of this study to contact those officials in HUD who were in a position to suggest the best possible programs under which to seek funding for the major work needed. This effort was totally unsuccessful. In the first place, the officials contacted were themselves very unsure of where money was going to be allocated in the next years and whether there would be very much in any event. But more serious, there was a general lack of understanding of the sense of alienation and frustration among the tenants, and of the need to suggest the most fertile avenues of approach so as to lessen the possibility of failure once again.

The Task Force, in cooperation with and support of the Columbia Point Development Council and Coordinating Committee recommends that:

1. The University of Massachusetts should support, either directly by financing, or indirectly by raising the funds, a massive new community organization effort
 - to mobilize tenants in order to make decisions on what physical and social changes will occur in the housing project;
 - to press agencies and organizations to get the resources to carry out the changes;
 - to oversee the implementation of these changes;
 - set up permanent community-wide communication vehicles; and
 - to provide the community support necessary for greatly improved security programs.

2. The University should use its influence and leverage to assist the tenants of Columbia Point and the BHA in raising about five million dollars for upgrading the physical conditions at Columbia Point, not just with a minimum of physical necessities, but including the amenities which would make it an appealing and attractive place to live. The University should offer technical assistance to the tenants in writing proposals and making presentations to solicit the necessary funds.
3. The BHA and HUD should expedite the renovation of the model building at 110 Monticello Avenue as a demonstration of what can be accomplished, and as an example of one approach to the kind of change that is desirable.
4. The city must carry out its promises to provide ball-fields and other recreation facilities at Columbia Point.

Once the above actions are accomplished, and genuine physical and organizational improvement is well underway, then:

5. It is recommended that the organized tenant groups explore management alternatives in greater depth; for example, the possibility of instituting a leasing cooperative as described by Roger Willcox of Technicoop, or, the possibility of tenant management.
6. On the assumption that improved physical conditions and a change in management will make housing at Columbia Point more desirable, the tenant organization should make the decision as to who gets to live there.

It should be emphasized again that the management changes proposed in Recommendations 5 and 6 are completely

contingent upon the execution of the actions included in 1-4. Taken separately they are impossible to implement, are irrelevant and diversionary. There is no value to the tenants in managing an impossible situation and they know it.

CHAPTER VIII

HOUSING DEVELOPMENT

One of the questions which the Task Force had from the outset hoped to answer was: In dealing with the impact of the Columbia Point campus on the community's housing, should there be housing development and if so, how much, and what kind? In fact, the scope of the study as outlined in the contract (see Appendix A) assumed that the answer would be Yes, and that detailed housing development packages would constitute part of this report.

However, as the Task Force proceeded with its work, it became clear that there was no issue on which the community was less able to commit itself with unanimity than the development of housing. Task Force members began to reach toward an understanding of the issues involved as the study neared completion, but realized that they were still far from a consensus with regard to what actions should be taken. Furthermore, there was a strong sense that the process which had brought them to their present understanding had not even begun among their neighbors and constituents, and that it would polarize the community entirely to make decisions and firm recommendations for development at this juncture.

For this reason, it is the Task Force's decision to present in this report the various alternatives that are available to the community and - building on the materials made available in the report - work further within the community for consensus and decision.

There is one exception to this decision: the Task Force has concluded that to call the campus at Columbia Point a commuter college is an exercise in self-deception, that a housing impact of major proportions is imminent, and that the University must undertake the building of housing for students on the site.

1. Why Housing Development?

In Chapter III, the Student Survey, it was concluded that moving the present student body to the Columbia Point campus would produce an immediate demand in 1973 for housing for 300 students; that if the student body remained the same size, 750 to 1000 students would be seeking housing convenient to the campus each year; and that, as the student body increased in size, for every thousand new students 600 would join those who need to live away from their homes. In Chapter V, an examination of the plans for transportation facilities showed that there can be no expectation of any real improvement in carrier service to the campus within the foreseeable future other than the shuttle bus service from Columbia Station. It is therefore not expected that commuting will improve for a large proportion of students in time to keep them off the local housing market.

There is a limited supply of local housing in Dorchester (and no one's figures, not the most optimistic, suggest that there are the thousands of decent and vacant housing units available in Dorchester and other accessible communities to meet the anticipated need). Without creating additional housing resources, a situation is created in which a finite number of housing units is competed for by an expanding number of housing consumers. The students' financial resources are also more expandable - they can double or triple their rent money simply by adding more people to the group seeking a housing unit - and they can therefore compete better in the impacted market than members of the existing community. The end result of the free operation of this limited real estate market is the displacement of community residents whose incomes do not permit them to compete at the higher rents. The most obvious way of changing the operation of the limited market is by expanding the market through the creation of more housing.

2. For Whom Should the Additional Housing be Developed? Students, Community Residents, or Both?

If the decision is made to try and meet this impact through the creation of additional housing resources, clearly the most direct way of meeting a new need for housing for students is to develop housing for students, rather than try to expand housing resources in the community to meet the increased total demand. Therefore, the Task Force's

basic recommendation, made with the specific support of the delegates from the Columbia Point project is:

Adequate housing must be produced on campus for those students who will want to live closer to the University. However, NO housing intended for students should be permitted to be developed within Dorchester itself. Nor should the University extend its site, either through further filling of land or through air rights over Morrissey Boulevard.

In support of this position, first, the University can attempt to meet the anticipated demand in a coherent way, staging the development of housing to accomodate each increase in student population, and building facilities which are designed to meet students' particular needs and preferences. Second, the responsibility for coping with University-generated housing demand remains the University's, rather than making the community shoulder the burden of housing development to solve a problem not of their own making.

However, a valid question can be asked, that, if scarce resources are going to be committed to the development of housing, shouldn't the community have at least equal access to it?

The study's basic premise was that after measuring student demand for local housing, a decision would be reached how to build sufficient new housing so that students would not displace community residents from their homes.

However, the Task Force has perceived that building an adequate number of housing units for students on the campus is not all that is needed to eliminate pressure on the community's housing. First of all, the Survey indicates that at this time only 36% of the students are willing to live in student housing. That percentage can be raised by the attractiveness of the housing developed, but it seems clear that all the students will not be housed in student housing. Private developers and landlords in existing buildings will still attempt to make housing in the neighborhoods available to students by displacing community residents through eviction or escalation of rents outside rent-control. It seems wise, therefore, that a

number of new housing units be produced to rent at levels within the means of the Dorchester people likely to be displaced, as a form of "insurance."

If for some reason student housing cannot be produced on the campus site, and the entire student housing demand is directed at existing housing, the Task Force still believes land resources in Dorchester should be restricted to community housing. The total number of housing units that could be produced on all of the available sites acceptable to the community would not make a significant dent in total University housing demand. If such a catastrophe takes place, all of the development resources available - sites, financing, skills and energy - should be devoted to producing housing that will enable the community to hold itself together.

The only possible exception to this general policy would be for housing for married students at the same income levels as present community residents. Conventional apartments produced at a rent level which low- or moderate-income married student couples can afford would be the same kind of housing appropriate for community use. Such housing would not have an inflationary effect on the community because its rents would be kept low. Furthermore, if students no longer needed to live near the campus, that housing could be occupied instead by community residents who need new housing.

3. Who Will Develop This Housing - the University, the Community or Private Developers?

Given both the legal and the practical constraints operating on the University, the only possible development it could participate in would be housing for students or University personnel. It has already been stated that the Task Force feels strongly that the University should in fact shoulder the responsibility for housing its students who cannot live at home, and should house them on the Columbia Point site where the students will have the greatest accessibility to their educational facilities, and where the greatest relief from student impact will be afforded the neighboring community.

The University should not enroll additional students until it has developed an appropriate number of housing units to house those who are willing to live in student housing.

Based on the projected Housing Impact in Chapter III, and the Survey finding that just under 40% of students are now willing to live in student housing, a reasonable staging chart for on-site student housing can be developed.

Year	Total Enrollment	Housing Impact	X 40% =	Students To Be Housed
1972	5,000	300		
1973	6,500	1,875		870
1974	8,000	2,500		1,000
1975	9,500	3,275		1,310
1976	11,000	3,650		1,460
1977	12,500	4,025		1,610
1978	14,000	4,400		1,760
1979	15,000	4,625		1,850

These figures should be modified in accordance with student response. Most important, if more than 40% of the students can be attracted to student housing, then more housing should be developed. The more students can be housed on-site, the more relief the community is afforded from the housing impact of the University.

The University does not itself have to be the developer of housing on campus. There are other arrangements that can be made under which University land is leased to a non-profit corporation to build the needed housing. Or the University might enter into an arrangement with a private developer to buy a particular building at a specified price from the developer who would build what the University wanted on the campus.

Theoretically, the community could even be the developer of on-site student housing. However, this is probably not a good investment of the community's energies, which should be reserved for coping with housing needs and problems within Dorchester itself.

There are advantages to having a community corporation which develops community housing: one can expect greater responsiveness to community needs, and housing designed and financed so that community people could afford the rents and would find the units appropriate. Under certain financing arrangements, sizable cash reserves would be built up which the community corporation could use

to even great advantage for the community. And there would be less temptation to use scarce land resources to build, say, luxury housing which would not serve the needs of either community or students.

Allowing private developers to do the job would have the advantage of freeing the community from endless and arduous details involved in the development process and might, therefore, permit them to invest their energies even more strongly in seeing that what was produced did, in fact, meet their needs. It would also keep the community corporation out of the business of being a large-scale landlord - a role which today's economics guarantees to be difficult and often antagonistic to tenants, however well-intentioned the landlord is.

But the Task Force cannot afford to avoid reality. Private developers are going to be investing in housing development in areas convenient to the campus, regardless of whether or not the community wants it. The same University-related housing demand that the Task Force is preparing to cope with is seen as a major business opportunity for people in the housing production business.

The University has received frequent calls during the last six months of 1972 from developers offering land, and proposing to build whatever housing the University wanted. These proposals from private developers involved medium to large-scale development. Since the University has, at this time, no authority to deal with private housing development, particularly off-site development, nothing can come of them in their present shape. Furthermore, most of the proposals are for housing which the University will either purchase or guarantee occupancy, also not realistic off-site. However, they indicate a high degree of interest in the area.

What is much more dangerous is that most of the private investment in housing in Dorchester for the anticipated student market will be in the purchase of existing housing for conversion to higher rent student occupancy. This is what has proven most lucrative in other parts of Boston - there is very good reason to expect it to be the most attractive opportunity again.

4. What Role Should the Task Force Play with Regard to Housing Development?

There are four basic choices open to the Task Force. First, to organize formally as a development corporation, hiring architects and contractors, and build whatever the community views as desirable. Second, to organize as a resource to provide technical help to local community groups which wish to get involved in development. Third, to keep the community organized politically so that it can negotiate with private developers and the city to try and modify all development proposals so that they meet the needs of the community. And fourth, to do nothing and let both neighborhood and private development efforts succeed or fail without interference. These options are discussed more fully in sections 9 and 10 of this Chapter, and in Chapter IX.

The Task Force has determined that it will, in fact, reorganize itself to carry out both the second and third roles suggested above. It must be stated very firmly here: The decision not to produce development "packages" at this time does not mean that the Task Force has rejected the development of community housing as one means of meeting the impact of UMass-related housing demand, but only that it has rejected for the present the role of developer.

5. What Are The Realistic Options, In Terms of Possible Sites For New Housing?

In order to make decisions about what kind of housing could realistically be built in Dorchester, an intensive effort was undertaken to determine the amount and location of developable land in Dorchester. The Task Force made an early decision not to pursue any possibility which involved the displacement of residents. Thus, the search was limited to vacant sites. The Task Force and its constituent groups, in making their decisions about the development of housing, would need to know the size of each site, its zoning category, the owner and the cost, in addition to location.

The BRA made available to the Task Force its list of two-hundred and fifty vacant sites which included sites ranging in size from four-hundred to one million square feet. A conservative estimate of the number of units which could be built on these sites, based on existing zoning and a 3-4 story height limitation, was approximately three thousand units. This information raised hopes initially that, contrary to expectation, it was possible to make a

real addition to the housing stock, if the community viewed it as desirable.

A spot-check of these sites in Dorchester produced a number of discrepancies, sufficient to call the entire inventory into question. The BRA list was matched with data from the Assessor's office to find the owner, the assessed value, and to ascertain that the lot listed as vacant indeed had no structure on it. Assessor's data and BRA data were contradictory. The files for the two agencies are not classified in a comparable way, making the checking process unnecessarily complicated and time-consuming.

The result of verifying was to reduce the BRA list from two-hundred and fifty sites to about one-hundred and ten. Seventy-five of the sites considered developable by the BRA were either not vacant or were being used by the abutters. Fifteen of the BRA listings did not have enough information to allow them to specifically be identified. Calculations, again based on zoning restrictions, indicate that only six-to eight-hundred units could be developed if all the vacant land in Dorchester were to be used (Appendix K).

This means that even if every lot could be purchased and purchased within cost limits for housing for low-income families, the number of units of housing which could be built to conform to existing neighborhood standards, would in no way meet the expected increase in demand.

Furthermore, the number of potential new housing units cited above - six-to eight-hundred - is based on a very preliminary analysis of existing zoning rather than on a design analysis of each individual site. Problems of site design, as well as possible unacceptability of some sites to the neighborhoods involved, or unwillingness of owners to sell on reasonable terms, will reduce the potential number of units significantly.

The results of the site survey and analysis defined three basic kinds of development possibilities:

- a) Development of a single large site. This option would be the only realistic way to produce enough new units to absorb the bulk of the increased demand generated by the University, without unacceptable impact on the community. Only one possible site was identified in this category - a part of the UMass

site itself, assuming a modification of the development plan for the Columbia Point campus that could make that land available.

- b) Development of some number of "medium-sized" sites. This option could produce several hundred units of new housing - far short of the amount required to meet all of the new University-generated housing demand, but enough to make some impact on the problems caused by it.
- c) Development of a set of small scattered sites. This option could produce as many new units of housing as the "medium-sized" site option - but to do that would require development of about one hundred individual parcels, rather than about fifteen.

The problem with this analysis is that the number of housing units needed to meet the anticipated increase in demand cannot be developed without either displacing present residents or changing the character and density of the existing neighborhoods. If a smaller number is produced than is needed, certainly any additional housing units will help to absorb University-related housing impact, and without them, the problem would be even worse. However, if the entire problem cannot be solved - all of the students housed without disruption of the community, or all of the community residents who might be displaced provided with alternative housing - then the effort at development may not be worth it, and the competition for a limited number of units might in itself be a divisive, destructive process for the community to go through.

Another issue is the probable cost of site acquisition for housing development purposes. Both the "medium-sized" and the small scattered sites in Dorchester are subject to considerable cost variation in the acquisition process. Although some of the sites in both categories are publicly-owned and presumably could be made available for housing at minimal cost, a substantial number would have to be privately purchased. Because a recognition of increased housing demand would be the reason the sites would be acquired at all, some speculative inflation in price should be expected. That inflation would continue and probably intensify over time, and the process of individually negotiating for, and purchasing, each of the sites

would lengthen that time period.

By contrast, the Columbia Point site is already state-owned, and its use for University-oriented housing would simply be a conversion of the land from educational use to education-related use. If the campus development plan is modified to reduce the projected total enrollment so that Colleges V and VI are no longer needed, then that site area can be converted to housing at either zero or nominal cost. Although construction costs will be high because of unfavorable subsoil conditions on the Point site, minimal acquisition costs would help to counter-balance that disadvantage.

There are still further problems in other stages of the development of smaller scattered sites. Many of the steps in the development process have to be repeated separately for each site; the site planning and architectural design, for example, is essentially a site-by-site process. Much of the legal work involved in application for and processing of mortgage financing commitments has to be duplicated for each site. Construction costs tend to increase and supervision of the construction process to become more difficult when the number of sites in a "package" is larger and their location more dispersed.

On the other hand, there are problems with the development of a single large site. First, whether housing intended primarily for students or primarily for community people, or both, is developed, there is a fear that a large site inevitably creates a sense of uniformity and isolation. This is as true of upper-income housing as of middle- or lower-income developments. Little flexibility and variation can be allowed in the housing produced without losing all the advantages of single site and a large number of units. Housing comparable to that already existing in the community and more suited to the needs and preferences of community people, is more difficult to provide on a single large site than on sites that are already part of the pattern of neighborhoods and their physical and social relationships.

A whole other set of problems results from any development which increases density in an already densely-developed community. This is obvious in the case of large-site development, but is also true for some of the smaller sites which, while not in any "productive" use, are open spaces that many neighborhoods would be reluctant

to have filled. They create some sense of "breathing room" in neighborhoods which do not have much of this. There are some other impacts as well, like increased traffic and pressure on schools and limited recreation space, which might be marginal when units are being added to a neighborhood at the rate of 3 or even 10 or 20 at a time, but which become very large issues when specific proposals are made.

The final issue that distinguishes between the large site and the smaller site options is community hostility to virtually any "scattered-site" development proposal, a hostility that grew out of the experience with the "Infill" program. The Infill controversy in Boston - and especially in Dorchester - was intense and bitter, and the Task Force has discussed at length the significance that it has for new development opportunities. Many of the problems that plagued the Infill process had no relationship to the concept of scattered-site development; the high cost of units produced, in fact, had little to do with the program and much to do with the developer.

The actual development problems that did result from trying to make use of small, vacant, publicly-owned parcels would be easier to avoid because they have been experienced once. Specific problems in the relationship between the Development Corporation of America and the neighborhoods certainly need not be repeated.

However, much of the fight over Infill was not over "problems" of the development process at all, but resistance to poor or minority families having access to housing in neighborhoods otherwise closed to them. Still, the Infill experience is on the record - and whether the perception of many people in the community about the cause of the problems is accurate or not, those perceptions are what form the image of scattered-site development. It will be an uphill battle at best to sort out what did happen then and what need not happen again, and to make a convincing case.

Some of these issues are relevant to development on Columbia Point, and others are not. The Columbia Point campus site is physically separated from most of Dorchester, and so does not create that psychological sense of added density. It is, however, directly adjacent to the Columbia Point housing development and has a direct impact on that part of the community and on other nearby parts of the community like Savin Hill. Development of

that site at the density that would best capitalize on its size, in terms of impact on University housing demand, could also have some substantial impact on the traffic and on the need for services. If primarily University housing were developed there, traffic generation would be less than from other kinds of housing since the principal trips would be to the rest of the campus, by foot or some other internal circulation system. Furthermore, developing University housing there will reduce the amount of traffic that would otherwise be associated with an intended commuter campus. However, the need for other services generated by such large-scale development would have to be explored further.

6. How Can New Housing For The Community Be Financed?

New privately-financed housing has for all intents and purposes priced itself out of the market. To build a sound but modest apartment development in Boston these days will cost at least \$22 - \$23,000 for each dwelling unit in the project. Paying principal and interest on the mortgage, taxes, maintenance, heat and other utilities will require monthly rents of \$250 - \$300. A family which can pay that rent without paying more than twenty-five percent of its income for housing must have an annual income of at least \$12,000 - \$15,000, an income level which less than fifteen percent of Dorchester families enjoy.

So, while Dorchester is not an unusually poor community, very few of its families can afford to rent housing in new, privately-financed developments. The reason that much existing housing is still rented at prices which Dorchester families can afford is that either the building's mortgage is entirely paid up, or the building cost much less when built or purchased (\$5-\$8,000 per dwelling unit) and thus the mortgage is much smaller, or the building has been refinanced at favorable rates, or the maintenance and repairs have been let go.

In order to build or rehabilitate housing in Dorchester so that it can be made available to community people, state or federal financing programs must be used. On the books are a variety of such programs - for homeowners and for renters, for low-income families and elderly or for moderate income, paid for by the state or by the federal government, either directly by HUD or the State Department of Community Affairs or through the Boston Housing Authority (see Appendix L for rent levels and income limits).

Not all of these programs are available or funded at this time, and some work better than others. Practically speaking, there are three ways of securing subsidized financing for community housing: through the Massachusetts Housing Finance Agency; using HUD's Section 235 or 236 program; or working through the BHA's turnkey or leasing programs.

The most accessible is the MHFA, which is authorized to raise money through the sale of tax-exempt bonds and to lend the money at low rates to non-profit or limited-dividend developers. Housing built through MHFA is required by law to be mixed income - at least a quarter of the units must be rented to truly low-income families. The rest of the units are divided according to MHFA policy among moderate-income tenants and so-called market rate tenants - those tenants who can afford the entire rent based on the low-interest mortgage. As a rough example, in a project of one-hundred units, twenty-five tenants would be paying \$40-\$90/month rent, fifty tenants would be paying \$100-\$185/month, and the last twenty-five would be paying \$160-\$250/month. They would all be renting the same kind of units, however, and no one but the manager would know which tenant was in which group of rent payers.

MHFA has expressed particular interest in being helpful in the present situation. As a Massachusetts agency, it has a special mandate to assist another state institution, the University, to deal with its problems. MHFA financing offers the following advantages: 1) MHFA is a direct lending agency, so the community developer doesn't have to persuade a bank to write a mortgage which is then insured and subsidized, as in the HUD 235 and 236 programs; 2) because MHFA funds are raised through sale of tax-exempt bonds, MHFA can afford to lend it at an almost equally low rate of interest, thus lowering the cost of the housing produced even without any further subsidy; 3) MHFA has its own allotment of HUD 236 funds to reduce rents to moderate-income levels, and of federal rent supplement funds to lower rents still further to low-income levels for approved developers; and 4) MHFA's processing is generally faster, more flexible, and more concerned with the quality of the housing produced than any other source of financing, thus both reducing processing costs and improving the final housing opportunity.

The second approach is through HUD's 236 program. Here the developer applies with his project simultaneously to a bank for a market-rate mortgage and to HUD for interest subsidy on the mortgage. If approved, HUD will

insure the mortgage and will also pay all interest costs above one percent on the mortgage so that the rents charged the project's tenants are considerably lower than if the project had been financed at the full seven or eight percent. There is no requirement in HUD 236 projects for mixing tenants with a variety of income levels. However, the developer can institute such a program himself by applying for either state or federal rent supplement funds if HUD approves.

The biggest problem with this program at this time is that HUD is itself displeased with the way the program has been administered and is cutting back drastically on funds. The White House is even more negative and there are rumors that the program may be closed out entirely. Inasmuch as the allocation of HUD 236 funds has never been adequate for the need in this area, it seems likely that they will be in very short supply in the next few years, and should not be counted on for relieving Dorchester's housing problems.

Finally, there are a variety of programs which may be available through the Boston Housing Authority, which will provide financing to build or lease housing which families of truly modest incomes can afford. Housing financed through the BHA is no longer limited to large public housing projects of the kind which have earned so much disfavor in the past. There are now development and management arrangements that make use of "public housing" subsidies with a much larger role for responsible private developers and for the community than in the past. Housing for low-income families and the elderly can, in fact, be totally privately-owned and operated, with the BHA limited only to financing the construction and bookkeeping the subsidy funds.

Again, however, there is a problem in that the new federal Administration has gone on record as being against any further extension of "public housing" programs. It remains to be seen whether there will be any further financing authorizations granted the Boston area in the next year.

There is one major limitation to all three financing programs described: production of housing for home-ownership is quite difficult. Ownership opportunities are available through the low-income housing programs administered by the BHA, but those provisions are new and largely experimental. Procedures for implementing home

ownership for low-income families are not well defined and therefore complicate the development process considerably. Still, if a developer and the authority are both willing to make the extra effort, home ownership is technically feasible.

MHFA, on the other hand, is authorized by law to carry out a home ownership program but has not yet set up any procedures or standards for doing so. The best MHFA can do under its current policies is to finance co-operatives or condominiums, which could be separate houses, but under one group management. To produce new housing similar to the traditional owner-occupied three-decker in Dorchester through MHFA will require new staff and procedures for that agency. If the Task Force decides to undertake this kind of small-scale homeownership development, its first step will be to seek support from MHFA.

HUD has on its books a homeownership program, the HUD 235 program. This has not been very successful in the Boston area for two reasons: first, the cost standards set nationally simply will not cover Boston costs (Boston has the highest housing costs of any city in the United States according to the most recent figures from the Bureau of Labor Statistics); and second, Boston banks have been notably unwilling to carry their side of the deal and grant the mortgage to be subsidized in the first place.

Preliminary discussions have been held with both the BHA and MHFA in the course of the study. As a matter of general policy, both agencies are concerned about the problem of the University's housing impact on Dorchester and Columbia Point and are willing to play whatever role they can to respond to the need for housing. Both have indicated that they are prepared to respond to specific proposals from the community at the appropriate time.

7. How Would Student Housing Be Financed?

Chapter I outlined the general legislative authorization granted the University to develop facilities which its Board of Trustees decides are needed. There is no explicit authorization or prohibition of the building of student housing at Columbia Point.

However, the dormitories at UMass Amherst

were built through the UMass Building Authority which was set up for the express purpose of selling tax-exempt bonds and financing the building of college dormitories, a financing model similar to the MHFA. There was an attempt to extend the Building Authority's authorization to UMass Boston, but this failed in the legislature - "UMass Boston is a commuter school."

It is doubtful that the University could use funds appropriated to it for classrooms or other facilities to build student housing. However, the University has access to a HUD College Housing program which makes direct loans to colleges at 3% interest, or subsidizes the interest above 3% on loans the institution secures from private sources. Recently in California HUD College Housing money was granted for the first time to a private corporation to develop housing which a university wanted.

The University, or a group set up for the purpose, could finance college housing through MHFA in the same manner that community housing is financed. MHFA law authorizes it to finance housing for persons and families of low and moderate income. Although MHFA has not previously financed housing for students, the law is clear that they are not precluded from doing so.

The biggest problem with using MHFA or HUD to finance buildings on Columbia Point lies in the extraordinary problems of construction there. Neither program can finance unduly costly construction. But the site is a recently filled dump over a saltmarsh; the soil is unsettled and all construction must be on pilings, most of which are one-hundred and eighty feet deep. The incompletely decayed garbage is also giving off methane gas, which must be pumped away from the buildings. And Columbia Point is directly in the path of several major approaches to Logan Airport and, therefore, the buildings require an unusual level of soundproofing.

The Task Force believes that in order to make student housing successful, it must be available at reasonable cost; no higher, certainly, than similar housing in the Dorchester community.

To keep the rents for student housing competitive, The Task Force recommends legislation authorizing the state to appropriate funds to cover the increased costs of building on the site - the costs of pilings, of methane gas control, and of soundproofing.

If these costs are paid for outright when the buildings are erected, then the permanent financing, which the rents will have to cover, will not be inflated by the unusual construction costs. However, once these extra costs are covered, student housing can be operated at no additional cost to the state.

8. Should the Community Be a Housing Developer?

If the Task Force commits itself to the development of new housing on sites in the community, it will also have to decide how to participate in the development process. The first question is: should the Task Force, or any community group, be the developer?

There is really no very precise definition for what being the "developer" means, except that the term describes the one participant in the total process who coordinates the work of all the others, and who controls the product. Conventionally, the developer is in a position of control because he owns the land or otherwise has control over it. A developer may or may not own the housing once it is completed. In a "turnkey" public housing development, or in conventional sales housing, the developer intends to sell as soon after completion of construction as possible.

Why do community groups themselves sometimes act as developers? Sometimes, it is necessary simply because the housing needed is a kind no other public or private developer is willing to try to build. At other times, community groups have acted as developers because they wanted to control the decisions about what was produced. Another reason might be to reduce the cost of the development by the amount of the developer's profit, because the community-based developer could function as a non-profit corporation. That cost advantage has often proved to be elusive, because of inexperience at dealing with bureaucratic financing procedures and with the construction of housing itself. And finally, communities have become their own developers because there was money to be made in the process, and that revenue could be reinvested in other community development activities.

On the other side of the coin, what are the liabilities for the community in becoming a developer? One

has already been mentioned - that community groups simply are not as skilled as some commercial developers at making the process work for them. That is not because they are inept, but simply because they are inexperienced, having never been through the process before. Community developers usually are forced to operate without "extra" resources, and their projects can be bogged down for months because they do not have an extra small sum of money, or access to additional professional services, to overcome a solvable but unexpected problem.

Besides mechanical problems in the development process itself, there are some important political liabilities for a community developer as well. One is that the attention of the group must be devoted to the development, and diverted from what may be ultimately more important issues and community organization activities. The housing development process is seductive because it has tangible dimensions and produces a physical product; community groups have often found themselves lost in the details of producing a token amount of new housing, while ignoring the maintenance and development of their political base. At the conclusion of the process, they have found themselves "indigenous" owners of new housing, but sometimes isolated and out of touch with the rest of the problems of the community.

A related issue is that becoming a "developer" can change the fundamental role of a community group. Suddenly shifted from being an advocate for housing "consumers" to being a producer, the community group is forced to make all the compromises and explain all the problems that make the provision of decent housing for low- and moderate-income families so difficult. The community group itself must announce that rents will be ten or fifteen percent higher than anticipated because of delays during development. It must fight for limited subsidy funds with other developers, and if it loses the competition, explain why. It becomes responsible for all the defects in the housing production and subsidy system, because it has become the most visible, most accessible part of that system.

9. What Control Over the Development Process Can the Community Have, If it is Not the Developer?

One kind of control is through political power, especially if a private or institutional non-community developer must have cooperation to proceed.

Zoning variances are frequently needed in the course of development. A community group may oppose such a variance simply on the grounds of resistance to change, or it may use its potential opposition as leverage in substantive terms. Agreement to support a petition for change in zoning regulations does represent a concession by the community, but it should provide the opportunity to achieve a concession from the developer to provide some facility that the community cannot produce for itself, like badly-needed apartments for the elderly within a larger development. Other public agencies are often only willing to grant approvals if there is evidence of support for the development from the community. This is especially true of financing agencies; there are so many proposals competing for their limited resources, and so much pressure on them to produce, that they are eager to avoid political problems whenever possible.

If it does have that kind of power, the community still has to decide how to use it productively. It will not be able to have control over every aspect of the development process; that is too high a price for almost any developer to pay, no matter how much he needs cooperation and support. Each community group will have its own view of the most important parts of the process to control or influence. One group may want control over selection of the architect; another may not care who the architect is, but wants approval over whatever design is developed. A third may want guarantees that a proportion of the construction jobs provided will go to community residents. A fourth may want some proportion of the units built for low-income families, or control over tenant selection for all the units, or even some voice in the management of the units when they are occupied. The important thing for the community to keep clear in its own mind is what it stands to gain or lose if some part of the process is uncontrolled; and there must be some consensus about the priority of control over different parts of the process and the demands and concessions acceptable in negotiations between them and the developer.

Many community groups that have preferred the kind of control they could only have by acting as developers themselves, have instead entered into a "partnership" with a commercial developer. They have done this because they wanted to use his skill and experience, and because he has access to "front-end" funds or "seed money" to pay for planning of the project, which they do not have or cannot get. They have been able to form that

kind of relationship because even in the production of housing for low-income families, there is money to be made by private developers, in development fees and in other kinds of revenues from the development process. That kind of relationship can be advantageous for the developer because the community group will assume the responsibility for potentially controversial parts of the work he would otherwise have to do, and that they want to control by doing it themselves.

Some community groups which have entered into that kind of "partnership" with private developers before they had learned what parts of the process they needed to control, and what the developer stood to gain or lose, found themselves to be "partners" in name only. Now, largely as a result of their being willing to share their hard experience, others can avoid repeating the same mistakes.

10. What About Rehabilitation?

In a community like Dorchester which is already densely developed and where, in some neighborhoods, there are large numbers of vacant structures that may be salvageable, rehabilitation is an obvious option. Why has this report focussed almost exclusively on the development of new housing?

Rehabilitation is often assumed to be an easier or quicker method for producing more housing, or a way of producing it at lower cost. Painful experience in many cities, including Boston, has shown the opposite. In cases where the exterior shell of the building is all that remains usable, not that much of a cost advantage is realized simply because the cost of the shell accounts for only a small proportion of total cost to begin with. Construction costs for installing new interiors and facilities is often actually higher than for new construction, because the seemingly minor variations among buildings in a rehabilitation "package" discourage standardization of materials and make each construction project a highly individualized job. Virtually all the work has to be done on-site, with no opportunity for prefabrication or preassembly, which could cut costs.

The process of assembling vacant structures for rehabilitation is at least as complicated and time-consuming as acquiring vacant scattered sites for new

construction. A substantial public inventory of either kind of property helps, but is often not enough by itself to make a "package" worth doing. The process for acquiring vacant buildings is complicated by the fact that many have been abandoned altogether by owners who cannot be located, which makes establishing the clear title required for any financing or rehabilitation virtually impossible. The public foreclosure process for properties that are tax-delinquent sometimes solves the problem, but is itself cumbersome and lengthy. Units that can be bought at low cost often are so totally deteriorated that they must be essentially rebuilt. Units that require less rehabilitation are considered by their owners to have some economic value, and sometimes cannot be bought at a manageable price.

Ironically, neighborhoods where there is a substantial amount of vacant housing, which provides a resource for rehabilitation, are sometimes considered unacceptable risks for investment, even by progressive financing agencies. They are afraid to lose their money in a good building in a deteriorating neighborhood. Unless enough funds can be guaranteed to make a dramatic impact on conditions in the whole environment, the vacant structures and other problems that do remain threaten the stability of what can be done.

Besides the City's inventory of tax-foreclosed properties, there is one additional source of units that may be a resource for a rehabilitation program. HUD currently maintains an inventory of properties which had been financed under various Federal housing programs, and which have been foreclosed because of a whole range of problems. The Federal government has no desire to own these properties permanently, and may be willing to dispose of them at a reasonable cost if large numbers are "packaged." Some will require rehabilitation, and all will have to be refinanced; HUD itself will presumably be willing to cooperate to meet both ends.

Not all of the properties will be adaptable to use by people in the community. Some may still be occupied, even though mortgages have been foreclosed, since HUD does not want to be in the position itself of displacing lower-income families without some adequate rehousing opportunity. Since there is a substantial potential inventory, however - at least several hundred properties, many of them multi-family - the possibility is worth more intensive exploration by the Task Force or individual community groups or agencies.

CHAPTER IX

VEHICLES FOR COMMUNITY CONTROL OR MANAGEMENT

Many of the recommendations made in this report require that a special community organization be set up capable of carrying them out. From the very beginning of discussions between the Task Force and the University, some form of community development corporation has been proposed by the University as a possible vehicle for meeting the various needs and opportunities arising in consequence of the opening of the new campus.

What is a community development corporation?

In barest essence, it is a group of community people, joining perhaps within other institutions in their area, organizing themselves as non- or limited-profit corporations for such broad or limited purposes as they would like to undertake. Corporations can think of themselves as Community Development Corporations (CDC's), or Housing Development Corporations (HDC's), but the actual scope and limits of such an organization's work are decided by that group at the time of incorporation. The names and initials above are labels, not limits. Churches, neighborhood groups, social organizations and almost any group which can demonstrate stability and continuity can organize itself for community development purposes if it desires.

What kinds of activities does such a Corporation undertake?

1. An obvious project for a community corporation in a community with a housing shortage is the development of additional housing resources for that community (this would most often be called a Housing Development Corporation). New construction of many housing units or a few, acquisition and repair of sub-standard housing, a leasing and management organization - all of these are ways in which such a corporation can help deal with community housing problems. The group's

decisions as to which of these techniques it uses are based on:

- Resources available to the community - vacant land, repairable housing, privately-owned housing available for lease or management.
- Activities with which the group is comfortable and believes appropriate to its mandate.
- Desires of the community which the corporation seeks to serve.

2. A more ambitious agenda for such a corporation is to try and "make money" for its community (most often called a Community Development Corporation). The corporation looks closely within its area for needs for goods or services which it might provide on a money-making basis, competitive with other businesses in the area. It might set up a dry-cleaning establishment, a convenience food store, a trucking firm, a small manufacturing or assembly plant, or even a discount drug store franchise. The primary purpose of such a venture is to set up a normal business, providing normal goods and services at normal competitive prices, but to keep the jobs and profits from such an endeavor within the community to be used for subsidizing needed community services.

The choice of projects that this kind of corporation might undertake would be governed by such criteria as:

- The financial feasibility of the proposed business.
- The degree to which local residents can be provided jobs within the business.

The corporation might even choose to run such a venture outside of its own community, if it felt the market for its product or other circumstances were such that a maximum return could be realized elsewhere.

This is a form of organization which deserves special consideration in the light of the imminent arrival in the community of a huge new group of consumers - the University and its citizens. First, local groups can organize to provide contract services to the University itself - cleaning, food service operations, deliveries and on-campus moving, grounds-keeping, snow plowing, etc. Second, local groups can set up concessions to serve students on the campus - parking facilities, book stores, coffee shops, stationery and supplies stores. And lastly, special businesses can be set up on main streets near the campus to serve the new student market - clothing and accessory stores, restaurants, records and stereo equipment, and the like. The community might even set up a car-towing agency to tow illegally parked cars on its streets in collaboration with a vigorous ticketing program by the police.

These business operations will have to be professionally managed in order to yield the maximum economic returns the community expects from them. And the community group which governs such businesses will have to learn how to direct the policy of their business without a major investment of their energy which should be reserved for activities of more direct concern to the community.

Furthermore, the community must be aware of potential dangers in setting up this kind of Community Development Corporation. First, there is a real conflict between seeking profits and providing needed services. Private business counsellors advise that no business venture will see real profits for several years, if it survives at all. In the case of a business deliberately set in a community whose resources are small, profits may be six or seven years in the future. To ask a community to put the thought and energies of its leaders into running for-profit businesses under these circumstances may be a diversion of their energies.

Second, in order to get this kind of corporation going, there is a temptation to oversell the project to get participation. This leads to over-expectation from the project, and as time goes on, and the project is slow to yield up its profits, community interest wanes, support for the project falls off, and a hostile attitude sets in.

Third, the kinds of contract businesses which it is tempting to set up in the present situation in order to bid for pieces of the University's business generally pay very low wages. Is it appropriate for the community to underpay its members in order to bid successfully for contracts? Or should the community corporation not avoid situations in which it cannot pay first-class wages to its members who work for it.

3. The corporation may want to provide needed services to the community which are either self-sustaining or need subsidy. In this category are food co-ops, day-care centers, job-training and referral programs, and so forth. Many organizations of this nature are already established in the Dorchester-Columbia Point communities and serious thought would have to be given to whether new or additional services might be better provided by these existing organizations or through organizing a new and hitherto uninvolved neighborhood or group of people to raise money to provide these services and to run the new organizations.

4. Finally, the corporation may wish to set itself up as a source of technical assistance and organization for neighborhood groups in carrying out their own programs. For example, the corporation will equip itself with housing development expertise and access to funds, but not initiate development itself (Housing Development or Assistance Corporation). A neighborhood group with land and a desire to develop housing could then use the corporation as its "developer" thus side-stepping the enormously difficult task of setting themselves up as developers. The same service can be provided in the economic development area so that the corporation is set up to provide access to capitalization in addition to organization and management advice, assistance and services (Economic Development Corporation) to local business ventures. In either case, the corporation would serve as a vehicle for the communication and coordination of the plans and activities of all the local organizations working in this area.

How would a community corporation be organized?

The legal requirements are not difficult and once the group has decided who it wishes to include, what it wishes to do and how it wishes to govern itself, it can get itself set up as a corporation with a minimum of fuss and some competent legal assistance. Those first questions are trickier than they look, however.

The questions of whom to include and how to run the organization are interrelated. What area does the organization cover? Are all residents members? Just voters? How young - eighteen, sixteen? Are organizations, or agencies, or businesses, or institutions eligible for membership? Or is their personnel? If the organization is eligible does its vote count the same as an individual resident? Can it vote? Who else votes?

Who can be an officer? What are the officers? How and when and how often are they elected? What are their duties, their responsibilities, their powers? How are they nominated?

How often does the organization meet? Who sets the agenda? What is a quorum? What kinds of decisions can be made at meetings? What decisions must be made at meetings? Can any of the rights or duties or powers of the members or officers be delegated or assigned to some other individual or group? Can there be an executive committee?

Two somewhat contradictory principles govern the answers to these questions. The first is, everyone who will be affected by the decisions made, or in whose presumed interests the decisions are being made, should be included in the organization. The basic power to accomplish the goals of the organization lie in including as members everyone who has a stake in the organization's achieving its goals. According to this principle, even those individuals or organizations known to have a different point of view might be urged to become participants, first, so that they might be persuaded and converted, and second, so that

the corporation has a chance to hear first-hand their interests, and their reason for opposition, and then perhaps to strengthen the organization's programs by adjusting them to include the needs of a wider spectrum within the community.

The second principle is, simply, power. The final control of the organization must reside in the community setting up the corporation. This is most easily and openly done by ensuring that a majority or even two-thirds of its board members are community people. While it is important to have people representing institutions and differing points of view on the Board, for reasons mentioned above, their usefulness is enhanced in direct proportion to the degree to which they have to persuade people of their needs and views, and to which they have to bargain for commitments with community members.

The organization's by-laws must be drawn up to carry out these decisions on who will be members and who will govern the organization plus other structural details which affect the governance of the organizations, including meeting time, frequency and notice, committees, procedures for elections, special requirements for spending money, amending the by-laws, and so forth. The by-laws should also include provisions for expressing dissatisfaction with the actions (or lack of actions) on the part of the corporation or its officers, including the possibilities of recall or expulsion. These by-laws are submitted to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, along with the group's Articles of Incorporation, when it registers as a Chapter 180 Corporation (non-profit) with the Secretary of State.

Finally, and most importantly, the organization must determine what it is it wants to do. The heart of the Articles of Incorporation is the Statement of Purpose. Here, the organization lists the complete scope of what it wants to accomplish, and the powers it needs to do so. The by-laws also must include sections describing the powers of the corporation, its duties, any limitations on its activities which the community may want to impose, and provisions for general members to bring issues and ideas before the officers and the Board. These sections are critical,

as they literally form the legal boundaries of what the corporation can and cannot do. Obviously, they can be amended. But, often the future success of the organization hinges on having successfully decided at the time of incorporation a precise description of what it is the group is setting out to do and the tools it needs to accomplish this.

Who funds the corporation?

Development corporations need fairly sizeable initial grants in order to be successful. The money is for several purposes.

First, the corporation needs operating funds for several years, or until it is able to support itself through fees or other income from its work. This doesn't happen for three to five years at best. Meanwhile, it needs operating funds of from \$50,000 to \$250,000 a year. Second, it needs so-called seed money to start the ventures it is involved in. The term "seed money" describes a use of money by which it is "planted" in various ventures, only some of which will be successful. A successful development corporation has a good ratio of successes to failures - it gets back enough money from the ventures which succeed to make up for the ones which fail. However, there must be an understanding that some ventures will in fact fail. Seed money is usually provided to development corporations in the form of a grant of half to two million dollars, and it is supposed to be used as a revolving fund.

There are a number of sources for these funds. Housing Development Corporations are funded by OEO under Section 221 of its Act, by the Non-Profit Housing Center of the Urban Coalition, and in this geographic area, by the New England Non-Profit Housing Development Corporation, which is jointly funded by OEO and the New England Regional Commission. The New England Non-Profit Housing Development Corporation is restricted in its activities at this time to rural areas and small communities, but it is expected that this restriction will be removed in the very near future.

Community Development Corporations are most frequently funded through OEO's Special Impact Legislation. Also, some of the large private foundations, like the Ford Foundation, are interested in projects of this kind and have funded them on occasion.

The University has offered the Task Force assistance in obtaining funding to establish a community corporation.

A Role for the Task Force

Having assessed the impact of the opening of the University's Columbia Point campus on the communities of Dorchester and Columbia Point, the Task Force is agreed that ways must be found to both resist the impact and make it smaller, and also to meet and absorb that part of the impact which is unavoidable. Inasmuch as the Task Force is a coalition of many diverse organizations and neighborhoods, there are different projects which different groups may wish to undertake.

The Task Force in coordination with community groups, should immediately seek to reorganize itself as a Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation, similar to the one described under number 4, above.

Its purposes should be:

- 1) To assemble housing development resources and skills and make them available to all the community groups which decide to work on housing development themselves;
- 2) To serve as a monitoring agent through which all private development in the area is reviewed by the community and, where official actions such as variances or zoning changes are required, to coordinate community reaction and response; and

- 3) To carry out other technical services that the community may request as the need arises for them, such as negotiating with banks for improved status for mortgages and home improvement loans within the area; buying or managing resident owned properties which the owner is having difficulty keeping in community use or wishes to divest himself of; and other technical assistance.

The Corporation will be set up to assist each local neighborhood group on projects that affect that neighborhood only and will not be authorized to overrule local organizations.

Its membership should be open to all the residents of Dorchester, Columbia Point, and, later, such other neighboring communities as wish to join. Its relation to the University should parallel the working relationship established now between the Task Force and the University - mutually supportive and advisory. The Corporation will need the University's help in getting started up, administrative and seed money funds. But the community's diversity, which is one of its strengths, dictates that the Corporation's structure should not include the University's even greater diversity within itself.

Once established, the Corporation will attempt to secure commitments from the City to give it major review power over all development within its area.

It is important that this structure be set up now, even though the Task Force has not yet decided exactly what kind of development it wishes to see taking place. Because just as the pressure from students to rent housing in Dorchester is already mounting, so, too, is the pressure from developers to get in on the action. If the Task Force's Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation is not a viable organization in the near future, then its intention of monitoring private development cannot be carried out, nor can its desire to serve the community with high-quality technical assistance in the area of housing.

CHAPTER X

PROTECTING THE COMMUNITY'S EXISTING HOUSING RESOURCES

Producing new housing either for students or for community people is not the only way that Dorchester and Columbia Point can protect themselves against University-related housing pressures. Another major part of the Task Force's strategy is to strengthen the ability of the neighborhoods to resist unwanted changes in the housing market.

1. Helping the Homeowner.

While one tends to think of tenants as those most obviously hurt through the impact of the University on housing, resident owners, especially those whose property includes some rental units, are hard-pressed in a different way to resist the effects of student housing demand.

Dorchester is not an affluent community. Even under normal conditions, housing is old and becomes more and more expensive to maintain with age. Taxes increase faster than the incomes of either owner or tenants. The costs of normal repairs and preventive maintenance is also on the rise. These are the factors which cause long-time residents of central city neighborhoods like Dorchester to leave, thus draining the neighborhood's strength and vitality.

The pressure caused by a major increase in housing demand, like that placed on the community by the University, intensifies and accelerates that process of attrition. Homeowners feel they would be better off if they sell homes in need of repair at a better price than they had expected and start again somewhere else, with a newer and better house. If their home includes rental units, they make the same decision, or alternatively decide that, if they rent to students instead of families, they can generate more income with which to make improvements or prepare for a future move.

The choices available to the community homeowner is limited still further by the unavailability of financing to make repairs and improvements. If he decides to sell, he is probably limited here also, as potential buyers who want to keep the housing within the means of other community residents also cannot get financing.

Only the speculators and the large commercial landlords who have no stake in neighborhood stability but only in high rent payers have no problem getting loans.

As part of its work during the study, the Task Force has discussed the role of the banks and other lending institutions in dealing with problems not caused by UMass, but worsened by its impact. Banks apparently are not aware that their operating procedures and policies for deciding which applicants for mortgage or rehabilitation loans to grant, are in fact turning a community over from resident owners to commercial landlords. They are also not willing to withhold financing from purchasers and owners of property whose clear intention is to produce inflationary increases in the cost of housing. It seems, that inflation is looked at by lending institutions as good, or at least profitable, business.

Some workable means of reversing these policies is absolutely essential to the long-term survival of neighborhoods like those in Dorchester. That would be true even without UMass, but the need to make substantial progress is even more urgent under the additional pressures that will be imposed not just on individual families who are displaced, but on all of the community's housing.

Part of the solution would be a more effective use of already enacted mortgage insurance and subsidy programs for existing housing by HUD. The role of FHA in suburbanizing the country's metropolitan areas is a clear indication of how public policy can be used to influence the real estate market. The use of analogous programs in central city neighborhoods has been marred by scandal and poor administration, but a bad record is simply no excuse for ignoring the need that remains to be met.

Another aspect to the problem concerns the conservative role played by mortgage insurers, both public and private. The Task Force is in the process of setting up meetings with banks and insurers to work out a better arrangement than the current one.

Still another part of the solution is for a community-based organization like the Task Force's Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation proposed in Chapter VIII to assume the role of "middleman" in arranging for mortgage and rehabilitation financing. The organization would have to convince banks and mortgage insurers of the need to change their policies to support resident ownership. This organization might also undertake a program of homeownership counselling for new buyers. Such a program has made banks more willing in other situations to participate in programs to expand ownership opportunities and prevent speculation.

Another important role for the organization is as a co-signatory for the mortgages and notes. To do this would require a major grant to the organization to serve as a guaranteed reserve. Banks would agree to define some conservative estimate of an expected foreclosure rate, and would agree to accept as a co-signatory an agency which had assets equal to the value of that percentage of the loans actually made. Banks should be urged to make loans at a favorable rate, as they do in other guaranteed-loan situations.

Still another function for a community-based "housing service" agency could be to act as an interim owner of property made available by residents who do want to sell, but would prefer to have their property used to the benefit of the community and are willing to negotiate a reasonable price. The amount of money required to support that activity can be minimized if sellers are willing to negotiate an option at favorable terms, or if the resale process including securing a permanent mortgage can be programmed to take place over a short period of time.

Obviously, the scale at which a program like this could be operated is directly related to the amount of "seed money" made available. The assistance

of the University in negotiating for private foundation support could be a key factor.

It should be clearly recognized that performing these kinds of functions would not be easier or less risky for a community-based agency than housing development would be. However, the purpose is different: to attempt in advance to insure that housing is not unwillingly converted to a use that threatens the stability of the community, rather than to replace it after it has been converted.

The Task Force proposals in the previous paragraphs will ensure that community landlords have access to the supports they need in order to keep their property in habitable condition. Both mortgages and home improvement loans will be made more available to present local homeowners. The Task Force will also investigate the value of extending Code Enforcement Programs under which home improvement loans are available at lower than market rates to more of Dorchester than is now covered.

More important, the City must improve its services to Dorchester, especially non-housing services, such as road improvement, snow removal, trash collection, street cleaning, and so forth which improve the neighborhood as a whole and help to maintain the value of properties.

Finally, the city must move to equalize residential property assessments throughout Boston. At present, the older sections of the city like Dorchester are assessed much higher than more recently built up sections. This places an undue tax burden on present owners and tenants and reinforces the other pressures that are forcing them out of the community or to undermaintain neighborhood housing.

In another area, the last ten years have seen tremendous advances in the legal rights of tenants. This was necessary because historically tenants have had very limited legal rights and generally no recourse from intolerable living conditions except to leave the property. The laws which have dominated landlord-tenant

relationships were developed in medieval England. Under these laws, the tenant's obligation to pay rent was independent of the obligation of the landlord to maintain property. Therefore, no matter how badly the landlord failed in his obligation to the tenant, unless there was a legal exemption, the tenant had to continue to pay his rent or face eviction.

Most of the efforts in the past ten years in tenant-landlord law reform have been aimed at establishing more of a balance of responsibilities. However, small landlords today, while still protected by law to a greater degree than their tenants, are confronted with increasing problems which make it difficult for them to manage their properties.

In addition to the financial help proposed above, the Task Force supports the concept of two-party code violation in which the tenant-caused and the landlord-caused violations are listed separately with the one not being held responsible for correcting the faults of the other.

Both landlords and tenants can expect speedier, better informed, and fairer justice in the newly established Housing Court in Boston. The Housing Court was set up to handle housing cases only and to remove them from other court dockets so that they might be handled more efficiently. However, this court, like the ones from which it was separated, is already backlogged to the extent that it cannot handle grievances quickly enough to prevent them from becoming major problems.

The Task Force supports Judge Garrity's request to the Legislature for one more justice and additional staff for the Housing Court to expedite the movement of housing grievances through the court process and urges the Legislature to act to appropriate the required additional funds.

The Housing Court is the major mechanism for landlords and tenants to redress housing grievances, and for the small homeowner it is the best channel for compensation of legitimate grievances against bad tenants.

2. Helping the Tenant

There have been many attempts in recent years to assist tenants in a period of increasing difficulty. The growing shortage of decent rental accommodations at modest cost created a market situation where landlords had little incentive to modernize or really maintain their property. Tenants had no place better to move, and so were deprived of the one market weapon theoretically available to them.

As seen in the last section, many landlords have tried to keep their end of the bargain in the face of increasing difficulties as well. And there have been a series of legal changes enacted to give the tenant greater ability to bargain with his landlord.

The most basic of these changes is in the old English common law concept which made landlord's obligations to keep the tenant's space decent independent of the tenant's obligation to pay rent. In both the rent control law and in the rent withholding and receivership laws, a tenant is given the right to withhold rent, to use it for needed repairs, and eventually even to have it reduced if the landlord fails in his obligation to maintain his property in legally safe and sanitary condition.

However, even these changes in the law can not by themselves improve the rental housing market, and their enforcement has been sporadic and often too time-consuming to help the tenant who needs heat or to have his plumbing repaired now. It is hoped that the Housing Court will improve the enforcement of the laws to the point where they do provide the tenant with adequate protection. In addition, there are some changes needed in both the laws and their administration that the Task Force believes will aid tenants in their efforts not to be displaced from their homes.

Two Task Force member organizations, the Dorchester United Neighborhood Association (DUNA) and the Dorchester Tenants Action Council (DTAC) presented a set of Seven Demands to the city of Boston in July, 1972 (Text of Demands in Appendix N). The Task Force

supports these demands fully. The combined DUNA-DTAC Housing Committee reports that a few details from the Demands have been met, but that they constitute a small fraction of the issues covered in those demands.

In addition to the Seven Demands, the Task Force supports the following changes in the laws and procedures protecting tenants in Dorchester.

a. Rent Control.

Bureau of Labor Statistics show that under the city's Rent Grievance procedure, rents in Boston went up even more than before. The Rent Administration is now gearing up to administer the newly-accepted state rent control law. Its basic goal should be to keep rents down, and not to institutionalize their increase.

1. Dorchester, the Boston neighborhood under the most imminent pressure at this time, should receive priority from the Board in setting up administrative mechanisms. Specifically, the registration of rents required under the law should be carried out first in Dorchester.

2. The Board has the power to define certain terms and standards used in administering the new law. Evictions are permitted under this law if the landlord "...takes the premises off the market." This phrase is defined in other cities to allow landlords to evict in order to rehabilitate the apartment, but not to convert it into larger or smaller units. If not carefully controlled, this clause becomes the loophole through which unscrupulous landlords evict responsible tenants. For use in Boston, the definition must consider:

i. The kind of rehabilitation proposed to be carried out. For this purpose specifications from contractors and evidence of commitment of financing must be presented to document the nature of the rehabilitation before the tenant can be evicted. Evidence must also be presented that the work to be done cannot be carried out with the tenant remaining in the apartment.

ii. A minimum time period that the unit will be kept off the market. A landlord may not evict a tenant for a small period of time and then re-rent it at a presumably higher rent.

iii. A minimum standard of improvement to justify eviction for rehabilitation.

3. The definition of the "owner" of an owner-occupied building must be strict, and the Board must investigate all units registered under this designation to verify that they are in fact occupied by the owner of the property and therefore entitled to the exemption. Many cases have been documented where a relative of the real owner or a straw who has some small percentage of the investment in the property is used to claim exemption.

4. Requirements for evidence or affidavit. Many problems in the enforcement of rent control result from allowing owners to make unsubstantiated descriptions of their units, rents, expenses, etc. Specifically:

i. require receipts to substantiate expenses which are alleged to justify a rent increase petition.

ii. require an affidavit if eviction is requested so that owner or his family may utilize the unit; prosecute for perjury where unit is not in fact lived in by those designated in the affidavit.

5. More information should be required to be presented to the tenant. Specifically:

i. the Registration Statement should be shown to each new tenant.

ii. a copy of the landlord's petition for rent increase together with copies of his receipts and other evidence.

6. The Rent Board should notify the Building Department whenever an eviction is granted so that an effective monitoring effort can be instituted against illegal conversion of apartments.

b. Enforcement of Housing and Building Codes.

Most of the difficulties which arise in enforcing health and safety codes are due to lack of enforcement or to the exercise of discretion in ways which undermine the effectiveness of regulation. Enforcement of the housing codes is an important tool in maintaining the quality of the housing stock. If the codes are not enforced immediately in response to complaints, the ultimate result is a reduction of the habitable housing stock. There are several remedies now on the books for tenants living in units with code violations. They are:

- Rent withholding, in which a tenant notifies his landlord of a code violation which has been certified by a housing inspector, and of his intention to withhold rent.
- Rent receivership, in which the tenant notifies his landlord of a code violation which has either been certified by a housing inspector or which has not been inspected within 24 hours of the complaint, and seriously impairs the tenant's health and safety, and of his intention to pay his rent to a receiver to be held in an escrow account.
- Tenant's right to repair, in which the tenant living in a unit with a violation which "endangers and materially impairs the health, safety and well-being of the tenant" may withhold up to 2 months rent and use it to make needed repairs.

1. The Task Force supports the legislation now before the General Court to extend the right now held by a tenant under the receivership law to pay his rent to a receiver if a serious code violation remains un-inspected for twenty-four hours after the complaint to tenants who seek to use the rent withholding law. This change will allow tenants to use the protection of the law when the Housing Inspection Department, whether through overwork or any other reason, fails to inspect the unit promptly.

To make the administration of these laws effective, the City can make the following changes:

2. There are only twelve conditions on the Housing Inspection Department's list of violations which "endanger and materially impair the safety and well-being of the tenant" and the individual inspector is allowed wide discretion in his citation. Theoretically, this discretion would operate in favor of the tenant, so that an inspector can truly cite any condition which is seriously hazardous under this section. In practice, inspectors seldom issue this citation. The Task Force recommends that an inspector's discretion be limited to adding conditions to the citation, and that the list of such conditions be expanded well beyond the existing twelve. (The current list of twelve conditions and suggested additions will be found in Appendix P.)

3. Time is a critical factor in the effectiveness of code enforcement as a mechanism to protect tenants and housing. If it takes two months or more for the Housing Inspection Department to bring a violation to court, then the tenant living with a serious violation is hardly being helped. The law specifies rather short waiting periods -- five days which the landlord has to correct a certified violation, for example -- but HID seldom acts within these time limits. HID should reinspect the housing unit within the specified five days and if the violation has not been corrected should institute court proceedings promptly.

4. The Little City Halls should be assigned an active role in the enforcement of codes throughout the city, and in Dorchester in particular. A specially trained person should be designated at the Dorchester Little City Halls to coordinate the activities of the Housing Inspection Department and the Building Department in Dorchester, to follow up on code complaints, to monitor the area for building code violations, especially illegal conversions, and to be the liason between the Dorchester resident and the departments at City Hall. This person should pool information and resources with tenant groups and representatives so that together they can expedite the resolution of legitimate grievances.

5. The City should support the change in law extending the right to begin legal action in serious code violations to tenants seeking to withhold rent as described in section 1 at the beginning of this section on Code Enforcement.

c. Relocation.

Despite all the best efforts of the community and the city, some tenants may be displaced by landlords in order to rent to students and faculty. These residents are in effect being displaced as a consequence of public action -- the opening of the Columbia Point campus. The Task Force has filed legislation to allow such tenants who can demonstrate that they were evicted for no fault and that their apartment was next rented to students or faculty to apply to the state Bureau of Relocation for reimbursement for moving costs and whatever other relocation assistance they would have been entitled to had they been displaced through a more overt public action (legislation will be found in Appendix O).

Another way to assist residents displaced is to set up a joint operation between the Task Force's Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation and the Boston Housing Authority to provide rent supplements for low-income residents so that they can compete successfully with University-related renters in the Dorchester housing market. The University should assist the BHA to secure funds for such a program from HUD.

CHAPTER XI

PUBLIC SECTOR RESPONSIBILITY

When the decision to open a branch of the University of Massachusetts in Boston was made, surely it was no one's intention to invest \$350 million of public money in a handsome facility which students and faculty could not get to, which would have teachers but no boiler-men to keep the furnaces running, and which was seen by its neighbors in Dorchester and Columbia Point as more of a threat to their homes than an opportunity for them and their children. But that is what has happened, incredibly enough, and the preceding chapters document the Task Force's efforts to come to an understanding of the problems faced by the community and to develop recommendations to solve these problems.

In the course of this effort, it has become clear that while there is no special villain in this story -- neither the University nor the legislature nor the city or anyone else involved planned to create trouble for the community - nevertheless, there is an overwhelming sense of failure of virtually every public institution involved to foresee the consequences of its decisions, and to act to remedy the problems it has produced once they came to light. On the contrary, the most consistent reaction has been to look for someone else to blame, and since many mistakes have been made, there is always someone else who can be blamed.

The Task Force believes that a first step in working out way out of the morass we are in, and away from the chaos that surely lies ahead, all the public institutions and officials involved must accept responsibility for what lies within their own province to cure. After each has demonstrated a commitment to its own responsibilities, it will then be appropriate to examine together what is still to be done, and to agree together on who is to do it.

What can the University do?

The University must begin by accepting responsibility for the consequences of its presence in Dorchester on Columbia Point regardless of who is responsible for its presence there. The Task Force recognizes

that the University has taken the first step in this direction by backing the efforts of the Task Force to understand what these consequences are and to develop recommendations to deal with them. This constructive relationship between the University and the Task Force must be maintained and strengthened over the next months. A strong alliance between the University and the community will be needed if the effort to obtain the kinds of compensatory remedies developed in this report is to succeed.

To maintain this alliance, the University must commit itself to the development of housing for students on campus -- for as many units of housing as the students will live in, not limited by arbitrary constraints of the students' income, distance of home from campus, or any other preconceived plan or number, however soundly developed. The Task Force will not hold the University to developing the number of student housing units proposed in this report if experience shows that these numbers are high, and that there are not that many students who will live in attractive, convenient and reasonably priced housing. By the same token, however, the Task Force demands that if this housing proves successful and there is demand beyond the figures we project, that the University commit itself to meeting that demand in order to protect its neighbors in the community from the consequences of any avoidable student housing demand off the campus.

The University must persuade the Governor, the Secretary of Education and the Legislature of the need to change earlier conceptions of the nature and role of the University at Boston. The seriousness of the lack of adequate transportation facilities and the magnitude of the housing impact are not recognized by those who have not yet looked hard at the situation. Their tendency, therefore, is to defend a concept which is no longer viable, and became unviable the day the decision to move the campus out of the center city was made. The understanding developed in this report of the inter-relationships between University policies concerning recruitment, enrollment, and no-housing, and other public policies concerning housing, transportation, and local education must be presented vigorously and persuasively if the University's and the community's needs are to be met.

What can the City do?

The City must share in the responsibility for placing the University on the Columbia Point site and therefore producing the problems now before us. The City's role in rejecting other more accessible sites, for however, valid reasons, led inexorably to the present dilemma and the city cannot limit its role to that of injured victim.

For the City, the first step must be to accept the community's efforts to hold itself together as a valuable asset for the City's well-being, not an irritant to be held off, or coped with, or pacified as best possible. A neighborhood resisting destruction is one which has committed itself to the city of which it is a part. It is made up of people who want to continue to live there and are interested in its permanent well-being, not temporary residents only interested in immediate services.

The City must commit itself to respond quickly and forcefully to issues over which it has control -- the administration of rent control and code enforcement -- before the problems represented by complaints under these procedures become unmanageable. These laws represent the first line of defense for the community in its struggle to maintain its housing resources.

The City can use its considerable strength on MBTA Advisory Committee to see that priority is given to the transportation problems of the area. The Task Force will support the City's efforts in the Legislature to secure the necessary funding. The City must work together with the Task Force to develop parking restrictions such as a sticker system for residential areas and then enforce them vigorously so that neighborhoods adjacent to the University are not strangled in thousands of University-related parked cars which ought not to be brought into the city in the first place.

The City must work closely with the Task Force and its Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation in the review of all development proposals in Dorchester which require City approvals. The Task Force will be prepared to monitor, review, and make informed recommendations on such proposals and the City should be prepared to give major weight to these recommendations.

What can the State do?

The Governor and the Legislature must accept the changed reality which was imposed when the decision was made to locate UMass Boston on Columbia Point. If the investment already made by the Commonwealth in the facilities now being developed is to be used most constructively and least destructively. Then further investment is required immediately in the necessary housing and transportation facilities and changes must be made in some of the policies concerning who is educated in these facilities. The State cannot allow the additional costs of opening its University to be imposed only on the Dorchester-Columbia Point community in which UMass Boston has been placed.

The incipient transportation crisis provides the State with the opportunity to prove that where there is adequate access and service, people will use public transportation to get to school and to work. If access and service are inadequate at the outset, commuting and housing patterns are established which cannot be altogether undone. The State must ensure that adequate transportation resources are available before the campus is opened and thousands of people attempt to reach it daily.

The State must attempt to prevent the displacement of community residents by students and other University-related personnel by recognizing the need for development of student housing on the Columbia Point site, by appropriating the needed site increment funds so that student housing will be self-supporting, and by providing access to relocation assistance to those residents who are none the less displaced.

The Legislature must support with adequate funding compensatory programs like the 13th year program so that the University is in fact available to the children of the community in which it has been located. The enormous financial investment in the very handsome physical plant is grossly misplaced if the investment is needed educational programs is stunted.

Finally, the Governor must continue his support of the communities in which the University is located through appointing to its Board of Trustees people with a broad understanding of the interrelationships of the state, its University, the people it serves, and the people who support it. The people of the Commonwealth must be served by a University Board which is sensitive and responsive to all the complex roles which a University plays, and those obligations which it must assume as a responsible public institution.

SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

When the Columbia Point site was designated for the permanent Boston campus of the University of Massachusetts in 1968, the decision was the product of five years of study, compromise, confrontation, negotiation, and eventually resignation. It was not so much a choice of a site as a reduction of possibilities for a site to just one -- Columbia Point. Some members of the Board of Trustees warned that accepting the site would result in consequences unanticipated and undesired by the University, but the Board saw no other path to take at the time.

The neighboring community of Dorchester-Columbia Point became alarmed as it saw the huge facilities under construction and realized in a concrete way just how many students were proposed to be brought to Dorchester -- 6,000 in 1973 growing to 15,000 students plus 2,000 staff and faculty in 1980. Everyone knew what had happened to the people of Cambridge first, and then Allston and Brighton when the students and other University-related personnel had decided to move into those communities. Unscrupulous landlords raised rents, evicted long-time tenants, and allowed groups of students who could pay more to take over much of the community's housing resources. Dorchester did not want to be next in this sequence, and the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force was formed to try and head off the approaching crisis.

The Task Force secured from the University of Massachusetts Foundation a grant to employ as consultants Justin Gray Associates to undertake a study of the housing impact and to make recommendations for action.

The Surveys

A Survey was carried out of a representative random sample of last year's students and this year's entering freshmen to try and determine where they were now living, and why, and where they thought they

would live if they were going to school at the Columbia Point campus in 1973. Questions were also asked concerning how much they now spend and would spend on housing, whether they would live in student housing and if so, where, and what kind, how they now get to school and what they consider an acceptable commute, and other questions pertaining to the likelihood of their moving closer to the Columbia Point campus rather than staying either at home, or in the current UMass student communities of Back Bay, the South End, Beacon Hill and Cambridge.

The Survey confirmed the community's fears. Despite the very real financial limitations that most UMass Boston students have to live with, 40% of them now live away from their families, including 15% who are married. Analyzing where the students live and why, it is estimated that between 30 and 35% of the student body attending classes at Columbia Point will be seeking housing accommodations closer or more accessible to school than where they are now living. Inasmuch as the student body at UMass Boston now numbers over 5000 and is proposed by the University's Master Plan to reach 15,000 by 1980, the 35% housing impact presents an already housing-short community with a major impact with which to come to terms. It was estimated that about 40% of this "impact group" was willing to live in on-site student housing.

The study continued with a survey of UMass Boston's support staff to determine what factor it would play in the housing impact. The results were not strongly conclusive, as it seemed that not many of the staff planned to keep their jobs when the job moved to Columbia Point, but those who did plan to go with the job had no intention of moving from wherever they were now settled.

The faculty and professional staff were not surveyed but their addresses were compared to a similar directory of M.I.T. faculty, and the housing patterns of the two groups were found to be quite similar. They were living in predominantly suburban communities, though a sizeable minority were found in

Cambridge, and the South End. It appeared that most of these would not move, as they were pretty well established. Furthermore, the University anticipated doing most of its additional faculty recruiting from the faculties of other Boston-area colleges which are being forced to cut back. Consequently, it is expected that even newly hired faculty will be Boston-area residents who are already settled and not too likely to move to the Dorchester-Columbia Point area. However there are unquestionably good housing resources in Dorchester for such families and there is little question that over a period of time, some influx of faculty can be expected.

Transportation.

The Task Force had not initially been charged with a transportation study, but early research into what transportation facilities were being prepared for the campus opening provided alarming news for the community. It seems that transportation was an expensive hot potato for which no one had take responsibility. The University had, in its first budget submitted after the site designation, asked for funds to plan and construct a facility to move students from Columbia Station to the campus. This and similar requests in succeeding years were turned down, each time with the admonition to stick to its own bailiwick -- education. However, the matter was never referred on to anybody with the responsibility for dealing with transportation until 1971 when the University, in desperation, asked the MBTA to see what it could do and a small consultant study was begun.

The consultant's documentation of the approaching transportation crisis boggles the mind -- thousands of students, traveling half an hour at a minimum on a rush-hour crowded subway line, are crammed into buses which are waiting on an overpass (which is slated for major repairs just about the time the campus opens), carted along a rush-hour crowded highway in its Southbound lane where they are joined by the bulk of the student automobile commuters, crossing its Northbound lane at grade at a signalized intersection against some of the heaviest rush-hour traffic

in the entire Boston area while an underpass is under construction so that, in the future at least, part of the on-grade crossing can be eliminated, joining North-bound automobile commuters at the two-lane entry to the campus, and then on into limited access parking garages or bus terminals. That is just the beginning. As the enrollment increases by 1500 students annually, the situation will become even more horrendous.

At a meeting organized by the Task Force, with most of the transportation agencies, it became apparent that no one, including the MBTA, had the resources to deal with this situation, and no one had done anything about coordinating efforts to determine a solution and find the resources. The Task Force has met with Secretary of Transportation and Construction, Alan Altshuler, pushed his appointment of a committee organized to study and coordinate all the current and future plans for dealing with the impact of the Columbia Point campus on traffic and parking, and obtained a commitment from the Secretary that the Task Force will have a responsible role in the coordinating committee and be provided with funds to employ its own technical assistance for this work.

In the area of transportation, the Task Force is recommending that:

1. The inadequate interim bus shuttle system between the Columbia Road MBTA station and the Columbia Point campus must not become, by default, the permanent system. It should be determined before the University of Massachusetts opens its Columbia Point campus that either (a) the buses will give adequate service to the campus, or (b) the buses will be replaced by a People Mover or its equivalent. Furthermore, no future expansion should take place until the transportation system has proved to be adequate for the increased number of students.
2. To insure that there will be an interim bus shuttle system between the Columbia Road MBTA

- station and the Columbia Point campus, the University of Massachusetts and the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force should vigorously support the MBTA in its 1973 request for capital and operating funds for this area.
3. To increase the ability of students and staff to reach Columbia Point from other parts of the city, the MBTA should experiment, during the first year of the University's operation, with express bus service from a number of convenient transfer points such as Forest Hills, Kenmore Square, Route 128, and Quincy Center.
 4. In conjunction with the Governor's office, the legislature, Secretary Altshuler's office, the MBTA and the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force, the University of Massachusetts should resume its campaign to obtain funding for a long range solution.
 5. To discourage the use of private automobiles for commuting to the Columbia Point campus, the University of Massachusetts should:
 - (a) drastically reduce the number of on-campus parking spaces it plans to construct; and/or
 - (b) adopt a pricing policy for the use of this parking, in excess of the cost of public transportation; and/or (c) encourage the use of car pools as a means of reducing the number of cars coming to the community; and/or (d) encourage the City to rigorously enforce on-street parking regulations in the residential areas of Columbia Point and Dorchester and, if need be, strengthen these regulations.
 6. To ensure the participation of the Dorchester-Columbia Point Task Force in all the transportation activities that relate to the opening of the Columbia Point campus, Secretary Altshuler should implement his promise to make funds available for technical assistance to the community.

Policies on Education.

The Task Force also found that the University believed that as it expanded it would be enrolling more and more students from outside the city of Boston, and that it had in fact reached about the upper limit of students it expected to be able to recruit from Boston. Furthermore, because of the larger pool of applicants, the Admissions Office at the University anticipated turning down some Boston students because suburban students would be more highly qualified.

The community's response to this was unequivocal. To begin with, in order to reduce the number of students coming into the community for classes and perhaps seeking housing in the area,

The total enrollment at the Columbia Point campus should not exceed 10,000 or that proposed for Phase II.

Next, if the city of Boston and particularly the communities bordering the University are going to have to bear the housing and transportation burdens imposed by the University's presence, then the Task Force believes the children of these communities should have first call on the educational resources now made available.

In order to maintain at least a 50% Boston enrollment out of the 10,000 total student population, the University should offer a policy of open enrollment to students from Boston.

And,

The University should in no way lower its academic standards in order to accommodate students with inadequate preparation. Instead they should institute a thirteenth year program through which a student can make up what he or she missed in high school.

Finally, the University's compensatory education program should be seen as temporary measures while efforts are made by the community and the Univer-

sity to upgrade the preparatory education Boston children are receiving in the city's schools.

The University should work with these schools to encourage greater numbers of their students to attend UMass Boston through advising them of the programs available at the University, and informing them of the general prerequisites which the high school should provide.

The University should also work with the School Department to orient the Department's policy-making process to support the interests of college bound students.

Employment Policies.

In terms of jobs, the University provides an unparalleled opportunity for the people of Dorchester and Columbia Point. However, that opportunity will not be realized if the University does not take some positive action to ensure access to these jobs and to training for jobs.

The University should negotiate with the Task Force a statement of understanding analogous to an affirmative action plan which will state specific numerical goals for Dorchester and Columbia Point residents to be employed in different job categories.

A branch personnel office should be established in the Dorchester and Columbia Point Field offices and direct recruitment for job openings carried out there.

The next step would be to institute training programs, which both prepare people for a specific job they will be placed in, and also provide them with basic skills which will enable residents to look forward to real job mobility.

Further,

The community has a mutual interest with the University in securing the support personnel needed by the University to carry out its educational mandate in a satisfactory manner and will support the University's efforts to secure an adequate budget.

A major proportion of services to the University are provided through contract with service corporations. Maintenance of buildings and grounds, and food services are two areas where little hiring is done directly by the University. Normally, contracts to perform these services are let to large contractors, but there is no reason why these contracts cannot be broken down and smaller discrete contracts be let to community contracting companies to allow them to reap some advantage from the huge purchasing power of their new neighbor.

Small local contractors must be provided special opportunities to bid on contract set-asides so that they can compete at their own level for a share in the University's business, and can thrive and possibly expand as their experience and capacity increased.

Housing: Columbia Point.

When the Task Force considered ways of protecting itself from the impact of the anticipated University-related housing demand, the obvious suggestion often made by outsiders was to use the Columbia Point housing development as a student housing resource. But the Task Force is a coalition of community people including the people of the Columbia Point development who are fighting for their homes and their communities.

Until sufficient housing resources are available for 1100 families at public housing rent levels, and the tenants of Columbia Point approve and support the move to other housing, the Task Force opposes any attempt to utilize the housing development for students.

The Task Force investigated the possibility of using the presence of the University as the housing development's neighbor as a means to improve conditions in the development for the residents. Six million dollars in funds for physical upgrading and replacement are needed. A major new effort at organizing the tenant community is needed. Changes in the management of the project or in the role the tenants play in management may be required. And greatly increased security is needed.

Most of the Task Force's work in this area has been discouraging. Funds for major reinvestment in the project are unavailable. Help in finding resources for a new organizing effort is being requested of the University. The possibility of changes in management status was explored by Roger Willcox of Technicoop Foundation, a group experienced in the conversion of low and middle income housing to cooperative management. Willcox was encouraging, but based his optimism on an assumption that the major repairs needed would be carried out and, as noted above, we have found no funds to do that.

But worse than this, the federal government's attitude toward public housing in the last several years has been highly destructive. It has not allowed monies legally owed the housing authorities and appropriated by Congress to be paid. One authority is already bankrupted and Boston is close to bankruptcy.

In light of these findings, the Task Force and the Columbia Point Coordinating Committee felt that the admission to the development of those married students eligible for public housing could possibly serve as a lever for obtaining additional funding to make the development habitable again. This avenue will be explored further with the University.

The Task Force, in cooperation with and support of the Columbia Point Development Council and the Columbia Point Coordinating Committee recommends that:

1. The University of Massachusetts should support, either directly by financing, or indirectly by raising the funds, a massive new community organization effort
 - to mobilize tenants in order to make decisions on what physical and social changes will occur in the housing project;
 - to press agencies and organizations to get the resources to carry out these changes;

- to oversee the implementation of these changes;
 - set up permanent community-wide communication vehicles; and
 - to provide the community support necessary for greatly improved security programs.
2. The University should use its influence and leverage to assist the tenants of Columbia Point and the BHA in raising about five million dollars for upgrading the physical conditions at Columbia Point, not just with a minimum of physical necessities, but including the amenities which would make it an appealing and attractive place to live. The University should offer technical assistance to the tenants in writing proposals and making presentations to solicit the necessary funds.
 3. The BHA and HUD should expedite the renovation of the model building at 110 Monticello Avenue as a demonstration of what can be accomplished, and as an example of one approach to the kind of change that is desirable.
 4. The city must carry out its promises to provide ball-fields and other recreation facilities at Columbia Point.

Once the above actions are accomplished, and genuine physical and organizational improvements is well underway, then:

5. It is recommended that the organized tenant groups explore management alternatives in greater depth; for example, the possibility of instituting a leasing cooperative as described by Roger Willcox of Technicoop, or, the possibility of tenant management.
6. On the assumption that improved physical conditions and a change in management will make housing at Columbia Point more desirable, the tenant organization should make the decision as to who gets to live there.

It should be emphasized again that the management changes proposed in Recommendations 5 and 6 are completely contingent upon the execution of the actions included in 1-4. Taken separately they are impossible to implement, are irrelevant and diversionary. There is no value to the tenants in managing an impossible situation and they know it.

Housing Development.

The Task Force explored many of the alternatives available to the community with regard to the development of housing: the need for housing, the reasons for becoming involved in development, the advantages and disadvantages to the community of getting involved in housing development, the potential resources in land and financing which are available to the community and the University, the kinds of control over the development process and the kind of housing produced which the community might seek, and other development-related issues.

The Task Force made several important decisions in this area. First, that,

Adequate housing must be produced on campus for those students who will want to live closer to the University. However, NO housing intended for students should be permitted to be developed within Dorchester itself. Nor should the University extend its site either through further filling of land or through air rights over Morrissey Boulevard.

To keep the rents of student housing competitive, the Task Force has filed legislation authorizing the state to appropriate funds to cover the increased costs of building on the site -- the costs of pilings, of methane gas control, and of soundproofing.

The Task Force in coordination with community groups should immediately seek to reorganize itself as a Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation. Its purposes should be:

- 1) to assemble housing development resources and skills and make them available to all the community groups which decide to work on housing development themselves;

2) to serve as a monitoring agent through which all private development in the area is reviewed by the community and, where official actions such as variances or zoning changes are required, to coordinate community reaction and response; and

3) to carry out other technical services that the community may request as the need arises for them, such as negotiating with banks for improved status for mortgages and home improvement loans within the area; buying or managing resident owned properties which the owner is having difficulty keeping in community use or wishes to divest himself of; and other technical assistance.

The Corporation will be set up to assist each local neighborhood group on projects that affect that neighborhood only and will not be authorized to overrule local organizations.

It must be stated clearly here: the decision not to include development "packages" at this time does not mean that the Task Force has rejected the development of community housing as an important means of meeting the impact of UMass-related housing demand, but only that it has rejected for the present the role of developer.

Protecting the Community's Housing Resources.

Creating additional housing resources is one way to relieve market pressures on existing housing. But there are other tools with which homeowners and tenants can protect themselves from the consequences of University-related housing demand.

The Task Force is beginning to work with banks and mortgage insuring agencies to develop a workable system by which resident homeowners can get the mortgage and home improvement funds they need to maintain their property and neighborhoods and restrain the

ability of large landlords and speculators seeking to exploit an exciting real estate business opportunity to convert an owner occupied neighborhood to a commercially owned neighborhood. There are some additional functions in this area which the Task Force's Planning and Technical Assistance Corporation may take on such as providing homeownership counselling to new homeowners, co-signing mortgages and notes, and so forth.

More important,

The City must improve its services to Dorchester, especially non-housing services, such as road improvements, snow removal, and trash collection which improve the neighborhood as a whole and help to maintain the value of properties.

The City must move to equalize residential property assessments throughout Boston.

The Task Force supports the concept of two-party code violation in which the tenant-caused and the landlord-caused violation are listed separately with the one not being held responsible for correcting the faults of the other.

The Task Force supports Judge Garrity's request to the Legislature for one more justice and additional staff for the Housing Court to expedite the movement of housing grievances through the court process and urges the Legislature to appropriate the required additional funds.

The Task Force supports changes in the laws and procedures governing rent control and enforcement of the sanitary code which will put real teeth into the effort to resist rent escalation and maintain housing resources in habitable conditions.

Public Sector Responsibility.

In the course of this study, the Task Force has found no particular villain consciously causing the problems we anticipate today. Instead, what is

revealed is a situation where no one has taken responsibility for the problems that have occurred, and the typical response when a public official or agency suddenly became aware of the problem has been to blame someone else.

The Task Force believes that as a first step to working our way toward a solution all the public institutions and officials involved must accept responsibility for what lies within their own area of jurisdiction and begin the process of solution there.

In addition to the specific recommendations which have already been cited:

The University must continue its efforts to maintain a strong alliance with the community and must commit itself to the development of as much on-site housing as students will live in. The University must also seek to persuade the Governor and the Legislature of the need to change earlier conceptions of the nature and role of the University at Boston and to secure support for the resulting changes.

The City must throw its strength behind one of its neighborhoods, which is resisting destruction. The City must commit itself to the vigorous enforcement of all regulations in the community, particularly rent control and building and housing codes, as well as new parking restrictions which are likely to be invoked. The City must work closely with the community on all development proposals for the area which require City approvals.

The State must accept the changed reality of the University and support the provision of compensatory education, housing and transportation facilities with the same commitment it earlier supported the construction of the educational facilities.

And finally, the Governor must indicate his support of the community in which the University is

located by appointing to the Board of Trustees in specific, a delegate selected by the community, and in general, people with a broad understanding of the complex roles which a University plays, and those obligations which it must assume as a responsible public institution.

Columbia Point 0728I
Dorchester-Columbia Point
Task Force/Justin Gray
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